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Abstract
Military and civil space acquisitions have received much criticism for their
inability to produce realistic cost and schedule estimates. This research seeks to provide
space systems cost estimators with a forecasting tool for space system cost and schedule
growth by identifying factors contributing to growth, quantifying the relative impact of
these factors, and establishing a set of models for predicting space system cost and
schedule growth. The analysis considers data from both Department of Defense (DoD)
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space programs.
The DoD dataset includes 21 space programs that submitted developmental
Selected Acquisition Reports between 1969 and 2006. The analysis uses multiple
regression to assess 22 predictor variables, finding that communications missions, ground
equipment, firm-fixed price contracts, and increased program manager tenure are all
predictive of lower cost growth for military space systems.
The NASA analysis includes 71 satellites and spacecraft developed between 1964
and 2004. The analysis uses a two-stage logistic and multiple regression approach to
analyze 31 predictor variables finding that smaller programs (by total cost), more massive
spacecraft, microgravity missions, and space physics missions are predictive of higher
cost growth. For schedule growth, the study finds that larger programs and those
developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Northrop Grumman, or international
developers are predictive of increased schedule growth, whereas those programs
developed by Johns Hopkins University are predictive of reduced schedule growth.
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PREDICTING COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH FOR MILITARY AND CIVIL
SPACE SYSTEMS

I. Introduction
Over the past decade, the United States has grown increasingly dependent on
space systems in order to conduct military and civil operations. The combination of this
dependence and the recent difficulties in space systems acquisition has given cause for
alarm among national leaders (Allard, 2005; Defense Science, 2003). Space acquisition
programs such as the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High and the National Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) have received
considerable national attention (and Congressional criticism) for their excessive cost
growth. For example, SBIRS High, originally estimated to cost approximately $4 billion,
is now anticipated to cost over $10 billion. Similarly, NPOESS has almost doubled in
cost growth, from an original estimate of approximately $6 billion to current estimates of
over $11 billion (Defense, 2003a; Government, 2006). The extreme cost growth
experienced by these and other military and civil space acquisition programs has led to
the perception that the space acquisition process is “broken,” ultimately eroding the
credibility of the space acquisition community (Allard, 2005; Gourley, 2004; Lee, 2004).
This study seeks to assist cost estimators by providing the military and civil space
systems acquisition communities with a set of models for predicting the likelihood and
quantity of space system cost and schedule growth. These models will enable space
system cost estimators to enhance their current estimating techniques as well as identify
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the primary factors associated with space system cost and schedule growth. Hopefully,
the creation of these models will result in better forecasting, and thus decreased future
cost and schedule growth, in the acquisition of space systems.
This chapter provides an overview of this study’s efforts to understand and model
space system cost and schedule growth by examining the space system acquisition
background, the specific research problem, the research objectives, and the methodology.
The chapter concludes with an overview of the study results.
Background: Space System Acquisition
Military space system acquisition began in the 1950s with the development of
ballistic missiles by the Western Development Division of the Air Research and
Development Command (ARDC). In 1955, ARDC expanded its mission by taking on the
responsibility of developing the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) first satellite. Civil
space system acquisition began in 1958 under the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) as a response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik. While the DoD
focused on strategic missile development and defense satellites, NASA’s role included
human space flight and scientific space exploration (“Brief,” 2005). Although many of
the missions for the DoD and NASA overlap (such as space-based communications,
weather observation, and environmental monitoring), NASA does not fall under the
purview of the DoD, rather NASA operates as an Independent Agency (“Official,” 2008).
In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave the Air Force primary
responsibility for developing all military space systems (History, 2003). In 2003, the
DoD reaffirmed the Air Force’s role in developing space systems when Deputy Secretary
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of Defense Paul Wolfowitz designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the DoD
Executive Agent for Space1 (Department, 2003a).
The Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is the current-day
successor to the Western Development Division of the 1950s (History, 2003). SMC was
originally aligned under the control of Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), the Air
Force’s primary acquisition arm. However, in 2001, upon the recommendation of the
Space Commission, SMC was realigned under the control of Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC).2 The Space Commission argues that placing SMC under AFSPC would
consolidate the operational and acquisition functions for space into a single organization,
thus achieving a “strong center of advocacy for space” as well as fostering an
organizational climate suitable for developing space professionals (Report, 2001:89-90).
In addition to having a separate acquisition community for military space systems,
there is also a separate process. While typical DoD acquisition follows the process
outlined in the DoD Instruction 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System,” and 5000.2,
“Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,”3 military space system acquisition
follows a separate acquisition process described in National Security Space (NSS) 03-01.
Through NSS 03-01, all DoD space acquisition programs follow a separate reporting
chain from other DoD programs and are automatically granted waivers from DoD

1

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has responsibility for the development of reconnaissance
satellites (History, 2003:1). This does not diminish the Air Force’s responsibility for space systems; for,
the Under Secretary of the Air Force also serves as the Director for the NRO (Department, 2003a:3).
2
The Space Commission recommends the creation of a Space Corps within the Air Force under AFSPC as
a mid term solution; in the long term, it recommends a separate military department for space (Report,
2001:89).
3
Although Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz cancelled the DoD 5000 series in 2002
(Wolfowitz, 2002), the DoD acquisition community continues to use much of this process through the
discretionary use of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, which details implementation of the DoD 5000
series (Vogel, 2003:4; “Defense,” 2004).
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Instruction 5000.2 (Department, 2003b; Fritchman, 2005). NSS 03-01 provides space
system acquisition professionals with a flexible and streamlined process tailored towards
the unique aspects of space system acquisition (Department, 2003b).
Military and civil space systems differ from other defense systems in two ways:
their operational environment and their acquisition life cycle.4 The operational
environments for space systems are harsh and remote. Space systems have to deal with
extremes (such as radiation, charged particles, and the vacuum of space) that land-based
systems do not. Additionally, due to the remote nature of the operational environment, it
is difficult to make corrections or modifications to the systems once they have been
deployed. The emphasis placed on system survivability of this harsh environment results
in large costs for space systems during the early stages of the acquisition life cycle.
Because testing in the operational environment (space) is unrealistic, space systems
acquisition places a stronger emphasis on test and evaluation during the development
phase (Fritchman, 2005; Sellers et al., 2004).
In addition to the emphasis placed on the activities of the development phase,
space systems also differ in their acquisition life cycle. Space systems are often acquired
in small quantities and usually do not have maintenance performed on them once they
become operational. Because of the limited quantities and the high development cost of
space systems, their acquisition life cycle does not typically include an extensive
production phase or the use of prototyping (Fritchman, 2005). As can be seen in Figure
1, a typical defense weapon system experiences the majority of its life cycle cost during

4

The acquisition life cycle of a program includes all of the phases for developing and producing a system
from the initial concept through operations and sustainment of the system (“DAU,” 2007).
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the operations and support phase, after the system has been deployed. Space systems, on
the other hand, experience most of their costs during the system acquisition phase (Figure
2), where system design, integration, and testing occurs.

Figure 1. Typical Weapon System Life Cycle Cost Curve (adapted from Paschall, 2005)

Figure 2. Typical Space System Life Cycle Cost Curve (adapted from Paschall, 2005)
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NSS 03-01 accommodates the unique life cycle for space systems by offering two
acquisition models: the NSS Small Quantity System Model (Figure 3) and the NSS Large
Quantity Production Focused System Model (Figure 4). The NSS Small Quantity System
Model is designed for programs that typically acquire ten or less units, such as satellites,
ground stations, and launch vehicles. Distinctive features of this model include the
Follow-on Buy Approval and the Upgrade Decision in Phase C (Figure 3). The Followon Buy Approval meeting occurs after the first or second unit becomes operational.
During this meeting, the decision is made as to whether or not to complete the small
quantity procurement. The Upgrade Decision meeting provides a forum to approve new
requirements that occur after Key Decision Point C (Department, 2003b). The NSS
Large Quantity Production Focused System Model applies to systems that are typically
acquired in units of 50 or more. Large quantity acquisitions for space systems are
primarily user equipment, such as hand-held user terminals. The NSS Large Quantity
Model is similar to the life cycle model used in typical DoD acquisitions. As can be seen
from Figure 4, this model includes Low-Rate Initial Production and Full-Rate Production
in Phase C, which are common in standard DoD acquisitions (Department, 2003b).

6
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes a number of other
differences between NSS 03-01 and the DoD 5000 series including the use of a Defense
Space Acquisition Board (DSAB) early in the acquisition process, an emphasis on a
revolutionary acquisition approach, and not requiring commitment to fully fund the
program. While the Air Force claims that the use of DSABs will result in early problem
identification and enable early involvement of senior leadership, the GAO argues that the
DSAB will result in investment decisions being made earlier in the process, before
critical technologies are mature enough to enter product development. The GAO
expresses concern about NSS 03-01’s practice of encouraging programs to incorporate
cutting-edge technologies through a revolutionary approach; it argues that the
simultaneous development of product and technology results in higher risk programs.
Additionally, NSS 03-01 does not require a commitment to fully fund the program at
program initiation (Milestone B), whereas other DoD acquisition programs are required
to commit to full funding upon initiation. Rather, NSS 03-01 gives the DoD Space
Milestone Decision Authority the flexibility to discontinue funding the program as late as
the Follow-on Buy Decision, which occurs after the first few units have become
operational. The GAO argues that these key differences between NSS 03-01 and
traditional acquisition policy encourage space systems acquisition to take on unnecessary
technical, schedule, and cost risk (Government, 2004a; Department, 2003b). The GAO’s
concerns about the risks in space acquisition and the ramification of these risks are not
unfounded. Numerous cost, schedule, and technical problems are occurring within
current space system acquisitions, causing Congress and the American public to believe
that the space system acquisition process is “broken” (Tauscher, 2007; Lee, 2004).
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Concerns over cost and schedule growth are not limited to the DoD; the GAO has
also criticized NASA for its inability to produce realistic cost and schedule estimates.
While NASA points to technical problems and funding shortages as major contributors to
cost and schedule growth, the GAO finds that the problem is not a program management
issue, but rather that NASA lacks a rigorous process for accurately estimating cost and
schedule. NASA cost estimators lack access to sound financial and technical data, and
thus are unable to produce reliable estimates (Government, 2004b).
In response to the criticisms of the GAO and other criticisms, NASA recently
revamped its procedural requirements. The revised NASA Procedural Requirements,
NPR 7120.5D standardizes the program life-cycle and program reviews, as well as
incorporates the Key Decision Points (KDPs) found in the defense acquisition life cycle
(Blythe, 2007). Figure 5 displays the acquisition life cycle found in NPR 7120.5D. In
many ways, the process is similar to the DoD’s space acquisition process, with heavy
emphasis placed on the upfront development activities and requiring approval at each
KDP in order to progress to the next phase. According to NPR 7120.5D, “NASA places
significant emphasis on project formulation” (National, 2007). The emphasis on early
program formulation through the number and frequency of technical and programmatic
reviews appears to exceed the reviews outlined by NSS 03-01 for defense space systems.
During Pre-Systems Acquisition, prior to program implementation at KDP C, NASA
space systems can expect to go through four program reviews: Mission Concept Review
(MCR), System Requirements Review (SRR), System Definition Review (SDR), and
Preliminary Design Review (PDR). DoD space systems, on the other hand, are only
subject to one review, SRR, during their Pre-Systems Acquisition Phase.

9
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Research Problem: Space System Cost and Schedule Growth
How can the military and civil space acquisition communities correct their
problems of excessive cost and schedule growth? One critical step is to improve cost and
schedule estimates for space systems acquisition. As with its assessment regarding
NASA, the GAO finds that DoD space cost estimators are producing unrealistic
estimates. In the DoD’s case, space cost estimators have a tendency to make unrealistic
assumptions, thus creating estimates that are highly optimistic. This underestimation of
program costs leads to cost growth as the programs develop (Government, 2006).
What is wrong with optimistic cost and schedule estimates? Underestimating
program costs or schedules hinders senior leadership’s ability to effectively plan and
make decisions. When a program’s cost or schedule estimate does not reflect reality,
financial planners are unable to adequately allocate the correct budgetary resources for
the correct time. As a program requires more funds than were originally planned,
decision makers have to respond by either reducing the quantity or performance for the
system, or they have to reallocate funds from other programs in order to make up for the
shortfall (Arena et al., 2006). Reallocating funds from other programs negatively impacts
these programs’ ability to meet their respective schedule and performance requirements.
Regardless of whether decision makers choose to have the funding shortfall impact the
original program or another program, the end result is that the delivered mix of
capabilities will not meet those that were originally intended by strategic planners. A
similar problem occurs if changes to the schedule result in funds being required at a
different time than originally planned. Additionally, increases in schedule affect the
capability mix by not delivering systems to the end users at the appropriate time.
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Another consequence of cost and schedule growth is that it decreases the
credibility of cost estimators and the space acquisition community, which can ultimately
hinder space acquisition programs. United States Senator Wayne Allard (2005)
expressed this sentiment at a Space Policy and Architecture Symposium:
The Air Force and its contractors have lost all credibility with Congress when it
comes to space acquisition programs. My colleagues and I are no longer surprised
by additional cost increases or notices of further schedule delays. Nor do some in
Congress give much credence to the Air Force’s proposals to fix these programs.
The Congress’s lack of confidence in Air Force space acquisition management
has resulted in enormous reductions in funding for space programs.
Senator Allard’s comment reveals that this loss of credibility has already resulted in a
Congressional response of reducing funds for space programs. Thus, in addition to
funding shortfalls from underestimating costs, the space acquisition community also has
to struggle with funding reductions caused by their loss in credibility.
This study seeks to mitigate these impacts of cost and schedule growth by
providing space systems cost estimators with a forecasting tool for space system cost and
schedule growth. In so doing, this study identifies factors contributing to space system
cost and schedule growth, quantifies the relative impact of these factors, and provides a
set of models for predicting space system cost and schedule growth.
Research Objectives
The purpose of this study is to answer the question, “Is it possible to create a set
of models that accurately predict the likelihood and quantity of cost and schedule growth
for space systems?” In order to answer this research question, this study first examines
five Investigative Questions (IQs):
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IQ1.

Which systems should be considered “space systems”?
For the purpose of this study, which systems should be considered space systems?

As discussed herein, military space system acquisition began with the Western
Development Division, which was responsible for acquiring both strategic missiles and
satellites. The current day space acquisition arm for the Air Force, SMC, is responsible
for acquiring launch vehicles and ground equipment in addition to the satellites and landbased strategic missiles acquired by its predecessor (History, 2003). Civil space system
acquisition on the other hand, focuses primarily on satellites and spacecraft. With
regards to military systems should “space systems” include all of these types of systems
since the space acquisition community holds the responsibility for acquiring them? Or
should “space systems” refer only to those that fall under NSS Small Quantity System
Model, which are similar to civil space systems?
This study chooses to include strategic missiles, launch vehicles, and ground
equipment in the definition of space system. However, recognizing that strategic missiles
are not being widely acquired today and that these systems do not fall under NSS 03-01,
the study also opts to provide models that exclude these systems. See Chapter II for
further information on space system definitions.
IQ2.

What are the current methods for calculating cost and schedule growth?
By examining the current methods for calculating cost and schedule growth, this

study can select an appropriate method for calculating growth. For cost growth, this
investigative question includes the determination of which aspects of cost growth are
important. That is, do all increases in cost qualify as cost growth? Perhaps some
increases in cost do not reflect a true increase in the costs estimated for the original
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program. For example, an increase in cost due to a change in the number of units
procured is a change to the program itself, rather than a change to the estimated cost of
the original program.
This study calculates cost and schedule growth as a percentage of the initial
estimate, occurring during the development period of the space system. The calculations
include quantity and inflation adjustments, where appropriate. See Chapters III and IV
for further details on calculating cost and schedule growth.
IQ3.

What characteristics of the program or acquisition environment are good

predictors of cost and schedule growth?
In order to accurately predict cost and schedule growth, this study needs to
identify characteristics of the program and acquisition environment that could be
predictors of cost growth. One of the primary goals of this study is to identify the best
predictors of growth and to quantitatively assess the relative impact that these predictors
have on growth. The analysis examines numerous predictor variables including:
commodity type, mission area, program size, and prime contractor, in order to establish a
set of models for predicting space system cost and schedule growth. See Chapter III for
more details on the predictor variables analyzed.
IQ4.

What are the current methodologies for predicting cost and schedule growth?
Assessing the relationship between the potential predictors and cost and schedule

growth requires selecting an appropriate methodology. Because this is an exploratory
analysis, it is useful to review other methodologies for modeling cost and schedule
growth in order to determine if this research can apply these techniques in whole or in
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part. Additionally, understanding the range of methodologies available assists in
revealing the strengths and limitations of the methodologies incorporated into this study.
IQ5.

How can the cost and schedule growth models be validated?
By implementing model diagnostics for validating predictive models, this study is

able to assess how accurately the models predict future cost and schedule growth.
Validating the models ensures the robustness of the models as a predictive tool, and that
the models will be useful to military and civil space system cost estimating and
acquisition communities.
Methodology
Due to the difference in available data for DoD and NASA space systems, this
study analyzes military and civil systems separately. The analysis of DoD space systems
applies linear regression to identify predictors for military space system cost growth.
Unfortunately, adequate data were not available for assessing schedule growth for
military space systems.
In order to analyze NASA space systems cost and schedule growth, this study
uses a two-staged regression methodology developed by Sipple (2002). The study uses
this two-stage approach due to the bimodal nature of the cost and schedule growth data
(see Chapter III for further details on the bimodal distribution of the data). The analysis
adapts Sipple’s two-staged approach by first using logistic regression in order to assess
the likelihood that a NASA space system will experience high or low growth. The
second stage uses multiple regression analysis in order to model the expected amount of
growth. See Chapter III for further details on the methodology.
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Study Results
The DoD cost growth analysis reveals that communications missions, ground
equipment, firm-fixed price contracts, and increased program manager tenure are all
predictive of lower cost growth.
The NASA cost growth analysis found that larger program size decreased the
likelihood of being a high cost growth program, where as more massive spacecrafts and
microgravity missions increased the likelihood of being a high cost growth program. For
those NASA programs that are likely to experience high cost growth, the amount of cost
growth increases for those programs from a space physics mission. For NASA programs
in which the logistic models predict that low cost growth is likely, program start date is
the best predictor of quantity of cost growth, with more recent programs associated with
lower cost growth.
The NASA schedule growth analysis found that larger programs (measured in
size of budget) are more likely to experience high schedule growth. For those programs
likely to experience high schedule growth, the linear regressions reveal that those
programs developed by JPL or an International developer (outside of the U.S.) experience
a greater quantity of schedule growth. For those programs likely to experience low
schedule growth, those developed by Northrop Grumman are associated with increased
schedule growth, where as those space systems developed by Johns Hopkins are
associated with a reduced quantity of schedule growth. See Chapters IV and V for more
details on the study’s results.
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Organization of the Study
This chapter included an overview of the problem area, the research and
investigative questions, and the methodology. Chapter II presents a literature review
which begins to explore Investigative Questions 1-4 on defining space systems,
calculating cost growth, identifying potential predictors of cost growth, and identifying
methodologies for prediction cost growth. Chapter III provides a detailed discussion on
the data and methodology, concluding the discussion on Investigative Questions 1-4, as
well as addressing Investigative Question 5 on validation methods. Chapter IV details
the preliminary, logistic, and multiple regression analysis of the data, as well as detailing
the diagnostic tools used for validating the models. Chapter V concludes the study with a
discussion of the results.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This literature review examines previous acquisition cost and schedule growth
studies in order to gain a greater understanding of space system cost and schedule growth
and how best to analyze it. In so doing, this chapter begins the study’s exploration of
four of the investigative questions introduced in Chapter I:
1. Which systems should be considered “space systems”?
2. What are the current methods for calculating cost and schedule growth?
3. What characteristics of the program or acquisition environment are good
predictors of cost and schedule growth?
4. What are the current methodologies for predicting cost and schedule growth?
This literature review examines these four investigative questions by establishing the
scope of the literature, identifying definitions for “space system,” detailing methods for
calculating cost and schedule growth, discussing candidate predictor variables, and
evaluating past methodologies.
Literature Scope
As discussed in Chapter I, this study focuses on cost and schedule growth for
military and civil space systems. Due to the limited number of space system cost and
schedule growth studies, this literature review also considers research focusing on
acquisition of all types of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).5 Recent

5

Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are defense programs that have an estimated Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) cost of over $365 million or an estimated Procurement cost
of more than $2.19 billion. Additionally, high interest programs not meeting these requirements can be
designated as MDAPs by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(AT&L) (“Life,” 2004).
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studies analyzing space system cost growth are primarily qualitative (Defense Science,
2003; Salas, 2004; Government, 2006). Although the space acquisition community has
placed considerable effort in modeling cost (Bearden, 2000/2001; Tieu et al., 2000), there
is a dearth of quantitative analysis on space system cost growth. Recent quantitative
studies on space system cost growth appear to be limited to two NASA studies: Tyson et
al.’s (1992a) and Schaffer’s (2004).
However, cost growth studies examining all MDAPs have been plentiful. Most of
these studies use Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) (which contain program costs and
cost estimates) as their source for cost data. All MDAPs are required to submit SARs to
Congress annually, with “exception SARs” submitted on a quarterly basis if major
changes occur (Hough, 1992). Most DoD cost growth studies use SAR data to examine
weapon system cost growth across multiple services and multiple platforms. These
studies may include cost growth data for space systems; however, these studies do not
conduct separate analyses on the relationship between predictors of cost growth and
space system cost growth.
Cost growth literature for defense programs and space systems far exceeds the
available literature for schedule growth. There are many possible reasons for the limited
number of schedule growth studies. Cashman (1995) identifies attitudes regarding lack
of control over schedule and beliefs that schedule growth on one program does not
translate to other programs as the reasons for limited research. Cross (2006) points out
other limitations, especially when using SAR data, including minimal reporting
requirements and inconsistencies in schedule baselines. Quantitative schedule growth
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studies examine all defense weapons systems; there do not appear to be any focused
solely on space systems.
DoD cost and schedule growth studies referenced in this literature review include,
but are not limited to, studies performed by the RAND Corporation, Institute for Defense
Analyses (IDA), Management Consulting and Research (MCR), Air Force Institute of
Technology (AFIT) students, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students, and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG). The DoD
cost and schedule growth studies conducted by RAND and IDA consist of a series of
analyses performed in the early 1990s (Drezner et al., 1993; Tyson et al., 1992b, Drezner
and Smith, 1990), as well as a follow-on series performed in the mid-2000s (Arena et al.,
2006; McNicol, 2005). Both the current and historical RAND and IDA cost and schedule
growth studies primarily center on descriptive statistics.6
In addition to the recent RAND and IDA cost and schedule growth studies, a
series of AFIT theses analyze DoD weapon system cost and schedule growth. Unlike the
RAND and IDA studies, the AFIT theses employ more rigorous statistical methods, such
as logistic and multiple regression analysis. These statistical techniques model cost and
schedule growth, thus enabling the researcher to make predictions regarding cost and
schedule growth for systems not included in the sample. Another key difference is that
the AFIT theses examine subsets of total cost growth, for example, schedule or
engineering changes (Foreman, 2007; Cross, 2006; Monaco, 2005; Genest, 2004; Lucas,
2004; McDaniel, 2004; Rossetti, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Moore, 2003; Sipple, 2002).
6

Descriptive statistics employ visual methods in order to summarize the characteristics of the data in the
sample, as opposed to inferential statistics which use the data to make predictions about the population
from which the sample was drawn (McClave et al., 2005:5)
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Defining “Space System”
In order to analyze space system cost and schedule growth, this study must
consider Investigative Question 1, “Which systems should be considered ‘space
systems’?” Tyson et al., in their study on NASA and DoD space systems, define a space
system as “a collection of integrated components to achieve a specific purpose beyond
the Earth’s atmosphere, such as Earth observation or planetary exploration” (1992a:4).
From this definition, those systems operating in the space environment ought to be
considered space systems. Thus, satellites and non-orbiting spacecraft are clearly space
systems. But what about systems designed to support these missions, such as launch
vehicles or satellite terminals? Are they not also “space systems”?
Sellers et al. (2004), in Understanding Space,7 describe the space mission
architecture as being composed of six parts: the mission, the spacecraft, the trajectories
and orbits, the launch vehicle, the mission operations systems, and the mission
management and operations. This interpretation is considerably broader than Tyson et
al.'s (1992a) by including the associated launch vehicles and infrastructure.
Another approach to defining “space system” is to examine which systems are
operated and acquired by the space segments of the DoD. Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC) operates all space forces for the Air Force. AFSPC operations involve the
control of space-based satellites, ground-based terminals and early warning radars, and
strategic missiles. The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is the acquisition arm
for AFSPC and is the primary acquirer for DoD space systems (“Air,” 2007). SMC
7

The Understanding Space textbook is widely used in Air Force space education, including courses taught
at the Air Force Academy, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and the Space and Missile Systems
Center.
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acquires satellite systems, launch vehicles, land-based ballistic missiles, and space system
ground equipment (History, 2003). Thus, from the current DoD perspective, space
system operations and acquisition not only includes all of the systems provided in Sellers
et al.’s (2004) interpretation, but also includes strategic missiles. Similar to the Air
Force, the Army consolidates its missile acquisition and operations with its other space
system acquisition and operations under a single organization, the U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command (“U.S.,” 2007).
How have other cost and schedule growth studies defined “space systems”?
Unfortunately, most DoD studies avoid defining “space system” when referring to
weapon system types, choosing instead to segment these types of systems into separate
categories such as “satellites,” “launch vehicles,” and “missiles” (Arena et al., 2006;
Tyson et al., 1992b; Wolf, 1990). As for the limited number of DoD studies that
reference space systems, satellites and launch vehicles are consistently treated as space
systems, while strategic missile systems vary. McCrillis (2003) separates strategic
missiles from tactical missiles, choosing to include strategic missile systems in the space
category. Drezner et al. (1993) combine strategic missiles with tactical missiles into a
single “missile” category.
Cost and Schedule Growth Definition and Calculation
In addition to exploring the possible definitions for “space system,” this study
must also Investigative Question 2, “What are the current methods for calculating cost
and schedule growth?” This section first examines cost growth, which includes three
main elements: the cost growth formula, the variance types, and the inflation and quantity
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adjustments. This section concludes with an examination of schedule growth
calculations.
Cost Growth Formula
Cost growth is a comparison of cost variance to the original cost estimate. Cost
variance is defined as the difference between planned cost (original baseline cost
estimate) and actual cost (or updated cost estimate) (Department, 1980). Cost growth
studies calculate cost growth in one of two ways. The first approach is to calculate cost
growth as a percentage of the original cost estimate (McNichols and McKinney, 1981;
Pannell, 1994; Bielecki and White, 2005):
Cost Growth = (Actual-Estimate)
Estimate

(1)

Equation 1 provides cost growth as a percentage, where a value of “zero” means the is no
cost growth, a negative value means that the actual cost is less than the planned costs, and
a positive value means that the actual cost is greater than the planned cost.
The second approach is to calculate cost growth as a cost growth factor (CGF) or
cost growth ratio (CGR). This approach simply divides the actual cost (or updated cost
estimate) into the planned cost (Arena et al., 2006; McCrillis, 2003; Tyson et al., 1994;
Drezner et al., 1993):
Cost Growth = (Actual)
Estimate
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(2)

Equation 2 provides cost growth as a factor, where a value equal to one means there is no
cost growth, a value less than one means that the actual cost is less than the planned cost,
and a value greater than one means that the actual cost is greater than the planned cost.
In addition to identifying approaches to calculate cost growth, one must also
define the components of the cost growth formula: estimated cost and actual cost. DoD
cost growth studies typically use the Development Estimate (DE), which is the estimate
submitted for Milestone B, as the baseline estimate.8 The DE is the best estimate to
capture the program’s planned cost because at this point the major design and capability
trade-offs have occurred and the program office is ready to begin system development
(“Defense Acquisition,” 2007; Jarvaise et al., 1996; Department, 1980).
While cost growth studies agree on which estimate to use as the baseline cost,
there is some variation in which estimate to use as the actual cost. A number of studies
use the current estimate as actual cost (McCrillis, 2003; Drezner et al., 1993; McNichols
and McKinney, 1981). By using the current estimate, not all programs will be at the
same stage in their development; some programs will be in the beginning of their
development, some programs will be near the end of their development, and some may
even be complete. Those programs that are near the end of development or are complete
will have incurred a higher proportion of their cost growth than those at the beginning.
Basing calculations on programs at different stages of development may cause those at
the beginning of their development process to bias the results because they have not yet
experienced most of their cost growth. Arena et al. (2006) show that programs continue

8

Milestone B, previously known as Milestone II, marks program initiation and is the point where a DoD
weapon system enters System Development and Demonstration.
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to incur cost growth until approximately 70-80% of their development and production has
been completed. Because of this tendency to incur cost growth through the later stages of
development and production, Arena et al. (2006) choose to include only completed
programs; therefore, their analysis consists of only final system costs.
Most DoD cost growth studies, however, use a mix of completed and on-going
programs. McNicol (2005) sets a minimum requirement for programs to be at least three
years past Milestone B to qualify for inclusion in his cost growth study. Other
researchers place a limit on the time frame by using costs from Milestone B up to the
initial operational capability (IOC) date, but do not include costs occurring after IOC
(Tyson et al., 1992b; Wolf, 1990).
Variance Types
As previously mentioned, most DoD cost growth studies use SARs as their source
for cost data. SARs include the original DE and current estimates (CE). Differences
between the DE and the CE are called “variances” and are separated into seven
categories: Economic, Quantity, Schedule, Engineering, Estimating, Support, and Other
(Hough, 1992; Department, 1980). See Chapter III for a more detailed discussion of the
SAR.
Most studies agree that variances due to inflation (Economic category) or quantity
constitute unforeseen cost growth, and thus choose to adjust either the DE or the CE for
these types of cost growth (see section on Inflation and Quantity Adjustments). RAND,
IDA, AFIT, and NPS studies typically combine the other five cost variances
(Engineering, Schedule, Support, Estimating, and Other), focusing on total cost growth
adjusted for quantity and inflation (Arena et al., 2006; Drezner et al., 1993; Tyson et al.,
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1994; Tyson et al., 1992b; Moore, 2003; Genest, 2004; Lucas, 2004; Wolf, 1990). Fast
(2007), in “Sources of Program Cost Growth,” argues that because Quantity, Economic,
Estimating, and Other variances represent changes that are beyond the cost estimator’s
ability to forecast, these categories do not constitute actual cost growth; rather, it is the
combination of Engineering, Schedule, and Support that constitutes actual cost growth.
DoD cost growth studies examining total cost growth have yet to adopt this
recommendation to exclude the Estimating and Other categories and focus solely on the
combination of Engineering, Schedule, and Support.
Instead of considering total cost growth, several AFIT theses examine these
categories separately in order to isolate the predictors for these individual aspects of cost
growth. Sipple (2002) examines cost growth due to Engineering varinaces within the
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation. Bielecki (2003)
builds on this work by individually examining the RDT&E appropriation for the four
other categories: Estimating, Schedule, Support, and Other. Rossetti (2004) complements
both sets of work by examining the Estimating and Support categories for the
Procurement appropriation, whereas McDaniel (2004) analyzes the Engineering and
Schedule categories for the Procurement appropriation.
Although using SAR variance categories is the primary method for analyzing cost
growth, several studies use the variance categories created by the DoD Office of the
Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). PA&E uses SAR data to create
its own cost database, dividing variances between those that are attributed to mistakes
and those that are attributed to decisions. The mistake variance is further divided into
five subcategories: production, development and engineering, logistics support, schedule
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and management factors, and other. Similarly, the decision variance is divided into five
subcategories: requirements, schedule, logistics support, external factors, and other. IDA,
CAIG, and NPS have taken advantage of this database in order to characterize cost
variances attributable to decisions and mistakes (McNicol, 2005; McCrillis, 2003;
Pannell, 1994).
Inflation and Quantity Adjustments
DoD cost growth studies use one of two methods to adjust for inflation: 1) convert
all program costs to base-year dollars for that system or 2) adjust costs for all programs to
a standard base year. Most studies, including those done by RAND, IDA, and MCR, use
base-year dollars to adjust for inflation when calculating cost growth (Arena et al., 2006;
Drezner et al., 1993; Tyson et al., 1992b; McNichols and McKinney, 1981). Recent
studies using the PA&E database adjust for inflation by converting all program cost data
to Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 constant dollars (McNicol, 2005; McCrillis, 2003). AFIT
theses take a similar approach, converting base-year dollars for each program into a
standard base year (Lucas, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Sipple, 2002).
In addition to adjusting for inflation, DoD cost growth studies also adjust for
variances due to quantity changes because cost estimators create the DE with the original
planned quantity in mind and do not incorporate adjustments for quantity changes. To
adjust for quantity, DoD cost growth studies take one of two approaches: 1) adjust the CE
to reflect baseline quantities or 2) adjust the DE to reflect current/final quantities.
Adjusting the CE to reflect baseline quantities provides cost growth in terms of the initial
cost estimate and prevents a “floating baseline,” where the quantity used for calculations
changes from year to year (Drezner et al., 1993). On the other hand, adjusting the DE to
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reflect current quantities allows the researcher to modify estimates while keeping actual
costs intact. When calculating total cost growth with both RDT&E and Procurement
appropriations, adjusting the DE to the current quantity maintains the proportion of
procurement cost to total cost (Arena et al., 2006).
After selecting whether to use the baseline or current quantity, the researcher must
then make the necessary adjustments to the CE or DE. Hough (1992) offers three
methods for performing this quantity normalization:
1. Normalize using variance listed in the SAR Quantity category only,
2. Normalize using cost-quantity curves, thus adjusting all variances that occur
at other than baseline quantities, or
3. Normalize using a hybrid approach by adjusting for quantity-related variances
(both those listed in SAR Quantity category as well as those listed in other
categories but described as quantity-related in the narrative portion of the
SAR) and then adjusting the remaining variance using cost-quantity curves.
Although Hough (1992) recommends using either cost-quantity curves or the hybrid
approach, most AFIT theses implement the first approach and exclude cost variances
listed in the Quantity category (Genest, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Sipple, 2002). One
exception is Abate’s (2004) thesis on missile system cost growth which uses the hybrid
approach. DoD cost growth studies performed by RAND, IDA, and CAIG implement
cost-quantity curves (also known as learning curves, cost improvement curves, or price
improvement curves) either directly or through the hybrid approach (Arena et al., 2006;
McNicol, 2005; McCrillis, 2003; Drezner et al., 1993; Tyson et al., 1992b).
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Calculating Schedule Growth
As with cost growth, schedule growth is most commonly calculated either as a
percentage of the planned length or as a ratio between actual and planned length
(Foreman, 2007; Cross, 2006; Monaco, 2005; Wolf, 1990). Other methods for
calculating schedule growth include measuring just the raw increase in length in terms of
how much the actual length exceeded the planned length (Drezner and Smith, 1990). In
addition to measuring schedule growth in terms of length, Cashman (1995) also provides
calculations for schedule growth in dollar terms and in frequency of schedule changes.
Predictor Variables
In addition to presenting methods for calculating the response variable (cost or
schedule growth), the literature reveals an array of possible predictor variables to assist in
answering Investigative Question 3, “What characteristics of the program or acquisition
environment are good predictors of cost and schedule growth?” This discussion begins
by reviewing quantitative DoD cost growth studies for predictors of cost and schedule
growth, which are grouped into three categories: program attributes, management
practices and acquisition strategies, and external factors. The discussion concludes with
an examination of predictors identified by qualitative studies focused exclusively on
space systems.
Program Attributes
Cost and schedule growth studies compare a variety of program attributes, in
order to identify those program attributes that consistently correspond with high or low
growth. The primary program attributes associated with cost growth are commodity type
and program size, whereas the primary characteristic associated with schedule growth is
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program volatility. Both cost growth and schedule growth studies identify degree of
technical difficulty as a predictor of growth.
Commodity Type. A number of studies compare cost growth across commodity
types, such as aircraft, ships, land vehicles, and missiles. As discussed herein, there is
some differentiation on the commodity classification; for example, some researchers
choose to place satellites, launch vehicles, and strategic missiles into separate commodity
classes (Arena et al., 2006) while others choose to combine these into a single space
commodity class (McCrillis, 2003). Studies that consider space as a single commodity
class consistently find space systems to be associated with higher cost growth (McDaniel,
2004:83-97; Rossetti, 2004:93-99; McCrillis, 2003). As seen in Figure 6, space systems
experience considerably greater total cost growth than other types of DoD programs.
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are numbers of programs.

Figure 6. Total Program Cost Growth by Commodity (McCrillis, 2003)
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Program Size. When considering program size, cost growth studies consistently
find that smaller programs (that is, lower cost programs) have higher cost growth than
larger programs (McCrillis, 2003; Dameron et al., 2002; Pannell, 1994; Drezner et al.,
1993). As seen in Figure 7, programs with Milestone II estimates (DEs) greater than $10
billion are unlikely to experience more than 50% cost growth, whereas a number of
systems with estimates below $10 billion have experienced greater than 50% cost growth.
Drezner et al. (1993) offer three possible explanations for smaller programs incurring
high cost growth: 1) oversight is often less for smaller programs, 2) equivalent increases
in cost are proportionally greater for smaller programs, and 3) R&D costs (which tend to
have higher cost growth than procurement costs) consist of a greater proportion of the
total cost for smaller programs. While Tyson et al. (1992a) find this relationship to be the
case for DoD space programs, they observe that NASA space programs are the opposite,
with larger NASA programs experiencing higher cost growth. However, a more recent
study of NASA programs contradicts this conclusion, finding that both NASA and DoD
programs experience lower cost growth as program size increases (Schaffer, 2004).
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Figure 7. Total Cost Growth by Program Size (McCrillis, 2003)
Program Volatility. DoD schedule growth studies find that volatility is one of the
main factors associated with higher schedule growth. These studies measure volatility in
a variety of ways including the number of changes to the original estimate (Foreman,
2007; Cross, 2006), funding instability (Foreman, 2007; Drezner and Smith, 1990),
technical problems, and design changes (Cashman, 1995; Drezner and Smith, 1990).
Technical Difficulty. DoD cost and schedule growth studies evaluate the degree
of technical difficulty by comparing cost or schedule growth of new programs to those
that have predecessor programs. One would expect that new programs would be more
technically challenging (and thus have higher cost or schedule growth) than modification
programs that build upon predecessor programs. Drezner et al. (1993) find that
modification programs experience lower average total cost and lower cost growth, as
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shown in Table 1. Other studies also consistently show this scenario to be the case, with
new programs having higher cost or schedule growth than modification programs (Cross,
2006; McNicol, 2005; Monaco, 2005; Tyson et al., 1992b).

Table 1. Modifications Versus New Programs (Drezner et al., 1993)
Cost
Growth
Factor

Number of
Observations

Average Program
Cost (billions,
FY90$)

Average Age
(years past
EMD)

Modification

1.16

36

4.0

8.9

New Start

1.21

84

6.1

9.7

Management Practices and Acquisition Strategies
DoD cost and schedule growth studies also examine the impact of management
practices and acquisition strategies on growth. These practices and strategies include
acquiring service, schedule characteristics, contract type, and prototyping.
Acquiring Service. DoD cost growth studies disagree on the impact of service
type on cost growth. In their study for MCR, McNichols and McKinney (1981) find that
the Army tends to have higher cost growth than the other services. This finding is
confirmed by a RAND study in 1993 (Drezner et al., 1993) and more recently by an IDA
study in 2005 (McNicol, 2005). Recent AFIT theses, on the other hand, are mixed with
some finding Navy involvement to be associated with higher cost growth (McDaniel,
2004), while others find Navy involvement to be associated with lower cost growth
(Rossetti, 2004; Bielecki, 2003). To further confound these results, a number of studies
have found that there is no difference in cost growth among services (Arena et al., 2006;
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Pannell, 1994). Pannell (1994) explains that studies relying on data from the early 1980s
are likely to find Army programs experiencing high cost growth because the Army was
going though its modernization program. He suggests that more recent data reflect the
completion of Army modernization and that the Army is now better able to control
program costs. Drezner et al. (1993) explain that Army programs are more likely to have
higher cost growth because the Army programs in their dataset tend to be smaller and
older than the Navy and Air Force programs. Thus, some of the cost growth attributed to
service may actually be due to size and age.
Schedule Characteristics. AFIT theses find that schedule characteristics, such as
the length of the Research and Development (R&D) Phase or the length of the Production
Phase, are good indicators of both the likelihood of cost growth and the amount of cost
growth. The most consistent finding is a positive relationship between the length of the
R&D phase and cost growth; that is, longer R&D phases correspond with increased cost
growth (Lucas, 2004; McDaniel, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Sipple, 2002). AFIT studies find
lower schedule growth for programs with a Phase A, programs that have a longer Phase
A plus planned Phase B, and for programs that have their Milestone C prior to their
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date (Foreman, 2007; Cross, 2006; Monaco, 2005).
Contract Type. As for acquisition strategies, IDA finds that multi-year
procurement contracts and development contracts that include incentives tend to have
lower cost growth (Tyson et al., 1992b). McNicol (2005) finds that total package
procurement contracts result in higher cost growth, and Rossetti (2004) finds that fixedprice contracts decrease the likelihood of cost growth occurring.
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Prototyping. The literature is mixed on the impact of prototyping on cost growth.
IDA finds prototyping to be an effective tool for reducing cost growth (Tyson et al.,
1992b); however, RAND finds that programs with prototyping experience higher cost
growth (Drezner et al., 1993).
External Factors
External factors impacting cost and schedule growth include acquisition reform,
political party, and external guidance. In Abate’s (2004) study on the impact of
acquisition reform on cost growth of tactical missiles, he finds that missile systems
reporting their Milestone B estimate during the post-acquisition reform period (19972001) experience higher cost growth than those reporting in the pre-acquisition reform
period (1991-1996). In Wolf’s (1990) study on political impacts on cost and schedule
growth, he finds that both cost and schedule growth are higher for programs that are
initiated during times when the Democratic Party has a strong majority in Congress.
Gounatidis (2006) finds that a Democratic President correlates with reduced cost
overruns for that year.9 In addition, Gounatidis (2006) finds that having the same
political party control both houses of Congress or having the same political party control
the Senate and Presidency correlates with increased cost overruns for that year. In their
study on schedule growth, Drezner and Smith (1990) find that external guidance such as
oversight reviews, legislation, and directives are associated with higher schedule growth.

9

Instead of evaluating SAR data for total program cost growth, Gounatidis examines annual cost growth
reported in Cost Performance Reports (2006:43).
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Predictors from Space Studies
In addition to the quantitative DoD cost and schedule growth studies, several
agencies have conducted qualitative analyses on cost growth among space systems.
These qualitative studies agree that the main contributors to space system cost growth
are: the increase in system requirements (requirements creep), the large number of Key
Performance Parameters (KPPs), the short tenure of program managers (PMs), the lack of
systems engineering expertise, the use of compressed schedules, the incorporation of
immature technologies, and the use of Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR)
contracts (Defense Science, 2003; Government, 2006; Salas, 2004).
From these findings on predictors of cost growth, a disparity has emerged; while
several of the factors identified by these qualitative studies (such as contract type and
schedule characteristics) appear in the quantitative studies, most of the factors do not.
What could be the cause of this disconnect? Many of the quantitative studies take
advantage of the data collected in the SAR, which limits their pool of predictor variables
to those provided in the SAR. Additionally, the predictors identified in the qualitative
studies may be difficult to operationalize (that is, difficult to measure), such as systems
engineering expertise. However, many of the factors operationalize rather easily, such as
the number of KPPs, the number (or growth) in requirements, the average tenure for
PMs, and the maturity of technology.10 In these cases, data availability is most likely the
reason that quantitative studies fail to incorporate these factors into their analyses.

10

The DoD uses a standard system to rate technology maturity, known as Technology Readiness Levels
(TRLs) (Department, 2005).
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Methodologies
The literature review now turns to Investigative Question 4, “What are the current
methodologies for predicting cost and schedule growth?” The investigation provides
valuable insight into understanding the variety of techniques employed by cost and
schedule growth studies, which include case studies, graphical analyses, and regression
analyses.
Case Studies
In order to assess the state of acquisition for national security space programs, the
Defense Science Board Task Force, led by Thomas Young, employs a qualitative
approach. The Young Task Force mainly relies upon interviews with government
personnel, retired government personnel, and contractors. Its interviews span a broad
range of the acquisition spectrum: high-level decision makers from the Pentagon and
AFSPC responsible for strategic planning; acquirers from SMC responsible for
implementing daily acquisition duties; and contractors from Boeing Company, Lockheed
Martin, and TRW responsible for designing and building space systems (Defense
Science, 2003). The Task Force augments its study with a more detailed examination of
three high profile space systems: Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High, Future
Imagery Architecture (FIA), and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) (Defense
Science, 2003).
In its 2006 report on space system cost estimates, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) utilizes a case study methodology involving detailed interviews with
program office and contractor personnel as well as the examination of documentation on
program cost and other program aspects. In this study, GAO focuses on six programs:
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Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite, EELV, Global Positioning
System (GPS) IIF, National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS), SBIRS High, and Wideband Gapfiller Satellite (Government, 2006).
One of the main benefits of a case study is the ability to gain a depth of
understanding of the particular program(s) being examined. However, case studies are
time consuming, costly, and limited by small sample size. Additionally, they do not
provide a quantitative measure of the relative contribution the predictors make to cost
growth. For example, both the Young Task Force (Defense Science, 2003) and the GAO
(Government, 2006) studies identify requirements creep as a contributor to cost growth;
however, because they are qualitative studies, they do not reveal how much cost growth
can be attributed to requirements creep. A quantitative study using regression analysis,
on the other hand, would be able to forecast the percent increase in cost growth for each
additional requirement (or for a given percent growth in requirements).
Graphical Analyses
Cost and schedule growth studies employ an assortment of methods for displaying
data in graphical and tabular form. Although these methods do not provide the reader
with a quantitative measure of the relationship between the factor of interest and growth,
they are an effective means of visually displaying data and identifying patterns. One of
the most common methods is the use of bar graphs and histograms, as shown by
McCrillis (2003) in Figure 8. In this graph, McCrillis divides total cost growth into
increments of ten percent, and then displays the number of systems (frequency) that falls
into each increment. From this graph, the reader can gather that most systems experience
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relatively little cost growth (between -10% and 20%). Interestingly, a high number of
systems experience extreme cost growth (greater than 70%).
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Figure 8. Total Cost Growth Distribution (McCrillis, 2003)

Presenting comparisons in tabular form is another common method for conveying
the relationship between a single factor and growth. In the case of Table 2, cost growth
factors are displayed by weapon system type (commodity class). Table 2 allows for
quick comparisons; for example, electronics experience relatively low cost growth (CGF
1.23), where as missiles experience relatively high cost growth (CGF 1.52). Although
displaying data in graphical and tabular form allows for quick identification of patterns
and trends, this methodology limits the researcher’s ability to interpret the data. Graphs
and tables provide summaries of the data in the sample; however, they neither reveal
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whether the relationships in the data are statistically significant nor do they provide the
researcher with the ability to make predictions about the relationships in the population
from which the data are drawn.

Table 2. Cost Growth Factor by Commodity Class (Arena et al., 2006)
Commodity
Aircraft
Cruise missiles
Electronic aircraft
Electronics
Helicopters
Launch vehicles
Missiles
Other
Satellites
Vehicles

Mean
1.35
1.64
1.52
1.23
1.76
2.30
1.52
1.40
1.55
1.67

Standard
Deviation
0.24
0.40
0.47
0.33
0.21
N/A
0.38
N/A
0.57
N/A

Number of
Observations
9
4
5
12
3
1
8
1
2
1

Regression Analyses
The preferred quantitative methodology among DoD cost and schedule growth
studies is regression analysis (Foreman, 2007; Gounatidis, 2006; McNicol, 2005; Tyson
et al., 1994; Tyson et al., 1992a; Wolf, 1990). DoD cost and schedule growth studies
employ three types of regression analyses: simple linear regression, multiple regression,
and logistic regression. Simple linear regression quantitatively describes a linear
relationship (Figure 9) between two variables: a single predictor variable (for example,
size of program) and the response variable (cost growth). It does so with a straight-line
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equation that expresses the response variable (y) as a function of the predictor variable (x)
(Schwab, 2005).

y

x
Figure 9. Linear Relationship

However, simple linear regression limits the researcher to examining the effects
of one variable at a time. Because there are numerous possible predictors of cost or
schedule growth, multiple regression is a more effective tool. Multiple regression
captures the relationship between multiple predictor variables and a response variable.
With multiple regression, one can determine the relationship between a predictor variable
and response variable while controlling for the effects of other predictor variables
(Schwab, 2005). For example, to examine the relationship between cost growth and
acquiring service, one might create a simple linear regression model to predict cost
growth based on service and find that Army programs correspond with higher cost
growth. However, if the Army programs in the dataset tend to be smaller than the Navy
programs, this difference could be problematic, since Dameron et al.’s (2002) study finds
that size impacts cost growth with smaller programs correlating with higher cost growth.
Thus, the results are unclear as to whether Army programs correspond with higher cost
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growth or smaller programs correspond with higher cost growth. By using multiple
regression, one can determine the relationship between service and cost growth while
controlling for program size, thus resolving the dilemma faced by using simple linear
regression.
Another benefit to multiple regression is that the relationship between the
predictor and response variables is not limited to a linear relationship; rather, multiple
regression allows for non-linear relationships (McClave et al., 2005). For example, if the
relationship between cost growth and years of development increases initially and then
decreases after a certain point, a quadratic model would be more appropriate (Figure 10).
y

x
Figure 10. Quadratic Relationship
In addition to simple and multiple regression, a series of AFIT theses, beginning
with Sipple (2002), also includes logistic regression in order to create models in which
the response variable is binary (that is, the response has only two possible values). In the
case of these AFIT theses, the analyses use a two-stage process consisting of logistic and
multiple regression. First, logistic regression models are built from the entire dataset in
order to predict whether or not a weapon system program is likely to experience cost or
schedule growth (response value either “yes” or “no”). Then, multiple regression models
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are built from the portion of the dataset that experienced cost or schedule growth in order
to predict how much growth will occur (Cross, 2006; Monaco, 2005; Genest, 2004;
Lucas, 2004; McDaniel, 2004; Rossetti, 2004; Bielecki, 2003; Moore, 2003; Sipple,
2002). If the models were to simply use multiple regression for the entire dataset, a large
portion of the data points would have values of zero. This would result in a dilution in
the predicted amount of growth as well as result in violation of some assumptions
required for regression analyses, such as normality and constant variance for the residuals
(the difference between the predicted and actual value) (Bielecki and White, 2005). See
Chapters III and IV for a more detailed discussion of logistic regression and residual
analyses.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has reviewed previous cost and schedule growth studies examining
all defense programs, as well as those that focus exclusively on space systems. The
literature review reveals that space system cost and schedule growth studies have been
sparse and primarily qualitative, while quantitative studies analyzing cost and schedule
growth for all defense programs have been numerous. By reviewing the literature, this
chapter has laid the foundation for answering four of the investigative questions:
1. Which systems should be considered “space systems”?
2. What are the current methods for calculating cost and schedule growth?
3. What characteristics of the program or acquisition environment are good
predictors of cost and schedule growth?
4. What are the current methodologies for predicting cost and schedule growth?
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With respect to Investigative Question 1, the literature reveals several definitions for
“space system.” The most restrictive definitions consider “space systems” to be only
those systems operating in the space environment, such as satellites. Broader definitions
can include launch vehicles, space system ground equipment, and even strategic missiles.
Limiting “space systems” to include only those operating in the space environment has
the advantage of ensuring that one is comparing similar systems (“apples to apples”).
However, by using the restrictive definition, researchers do not capture the entire system
necessary for executing space missions. If the focus is on the DoD space acquisition
community, the restrictive definition does not capture all of the systems this community
acquires since the DoD space acquisition community is responsible for acquiring not only
space-based, but also land-based assets including strategic missiles.
When exploring Investigative Question 2, cost and schedule growth studies
provide two methods for calculating growth, as a percentage or as a growth factor. For
cost growth, the major differences in the calculations are not in the formulas, but rather in
the definition of actual and estimated costs. These differences include: how far along in
development a program needs to be, which variances to include, and how to adjust for
quantity.
Investigative Question 3 provides valuable insight into predictors of cost and
schedule growth. Interestingly, for cost growth, the qualitative studies and the
quantitative studies differ on the factors they considered and thus differ on which factors
they find contribute most to cost growth. The most likely cause of this disconnect is that
quantitative studies often limit their predictor variables to those available in the SAR, and
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many of the factors considered in qualitative studies are unlikely to be available for the
large number of programs considered by quantitative studies.
With respect to Investigative Question 4, the literature demonstrates a range of
qualitative and quantitative methodologies for assessing the predictors, with each method
having strengths and limitations. Qualitative methods, such as case studies, provide the
advantage of a depth of understanding into the programs being examined, but the small
sample size limits the ability to generalize the results to other systems. Quantitative
methods, such as regression analysis, provide the advantage of statistical rigor and enable
the researcher to numerically assess how much a predictor contributes to cost or schedule
growth. However, quantitative methods may be limited by available data, and thus
unable to account for all factors contributing to space system cost or schedule growth.
The literature reviewed herein contributes to this study by providing a greater
understanding of how past researchers have defined space systems, calculated cost and
schedule growth, identified predictors, and assessed those predictors. This study builds
upon this literature over the course of the next several chapters. Chapter III presents this
study’s definition of “space system,” method for calculating growth, and methodology
for predicting space system cost and schedule growth. Chapter IV incorporates the
predictors identified by the literature to quantitatively assess which predictors are best for
predicting space system cost and schedule growth.
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III. Methodology and Data
Chapter Overview
This study defines “space systems” using the broadest definition: including not
only satellites and spacecraft, but also launch vehicles, strategic missiles, and spacerelated ground equipment. This study uses two separate sets of data: Department of
Defense (DoD) data and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) data.
The DoD dataset includes satellites, launch vehicles, strategic missiles, and space-related
ground equipment; the NASA dataset only includes spacecraft and satellites. This
chapter begins with the discussion of the methodology used by this study, and concludes
with a discussion of each of the datasets. Each dataset discussion details the data source,
the response variables and how they are calculated, the potential predictor variables, and
the diagnostics used to validate the models.
Methodology
Figure 11 presents the methodology used in this study. The methodology begins
with collection of the data, proceeds to a preliminary and inferential analysis of the data,
and concludes with interpreting the results.
Data Collection
The literature review aids the data collection process by identifying potential
predictor variables, as well as sources of data for previous studies. In the case of this
study, two separate datasets are compiled – one for DoD space systems and one for
NASA space systems. These datasets are kept separate due to the differences in the types
of space systems included and the available data for the predictor variables.
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Figure 11. Methodology Flow Chart
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The primary source of data for DoD space systems is the Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR) (Selected, 2003; “Selected,” 2007; “DAMIR,” 2007). As discussed in
Chapter II, the SAR includes cost, schedule, and programmatic information for Major
Defense Acquisition Programs. The DoD dataset consists of data for 21 programs
including satellites, launch vehicles, missiles, and ground equipment. See DoD data
discussion herein for more detailed information regarding the data used in this study.
The NASA dataset combines data from two previous cost growth studies: the
1992 Institute for Defense Analyses study (Tyson et al., 1992a) and the 2004 NASA
Headquarters Cost Analysis Division study (Schaffer, 2004). Additional data were added
to this dataset based on publicly available online NASA sources including National Space
Science Data Center (“NSSDC,” 2007), JPL Mission and Space Craft Library (“MSL,”
2007), and NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (“Science,” 2007). Personal
communications with program personnel provided additional data. The NASA dataset
includes cost, schedule, and descriptive data for 71 satellites and spacecraft. The
availability of schedule data for 47 of these systems allows for this study to include an
analysis of schedule growth in addition to cost growth. See NASA data discussion herein
for more detailed information regarding the data used in this study.
After compiling the data into their respective datasets, the data go through a
rigorous “data scrub.” This data scrub includes analyses on individual variables to ensure
that all of the values have been entered correctly and all calculated fields are correctly
tabulated. Additionally, the data scrub identifies any unusual patterns or observations
within a particular variable. For example, Figure 12 displays a histogram of the cost
growth values for the DoD space systems. As can be seen, there is an outlier that has
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three times the cost growth of the next highest observation. This observation is noted and
may be removed later on if it unduly influences the models.
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Figure 12. Histogram of DoD Cost Growth

In addition to identifying single points that are unusual, the data scrub also identifies
unusual patterns, such as distributions that appear bimodal11 rather than normal. Unusual
patterns may indicate the need to create additional variables to capture these patterns.
See the discussion herein on the NASA response variables, for details on creating logistic
response variables to capture bimodal distributions.
Preliminary Analysis
The cost and schedule growth analysis begins with the use of graphical
descriptive methods. These methods compare the cost/schedule growth response variable
to a single predictor variable using bar charts to compare means. After identifying
potential patterns, the Preliminary Analysis uses Student’s t-tests to determine the
statistical significance of these relationships. Correlation analyses are also used to
11

Bimodal distributions have two distinct modes (that is, two relative maximum values). Such a
distribution may represent two separate distributions.
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identify relationships between predictor variables. See Chapter IV for the Preliminary
Analysis and more information on the analytical techniques used.
Inferential Analysis
Simple Regressions. The inferential statistical analysis begins with performing
simple regressions. For each response variable, each predictor variable is regressed
against it individually to determine which predictors are the best indicators of cost or
schedule growth. This consists of several dozen regressions for each response variable.
Preliminary Model. Those predictor variables that are significant at the 5% level
represent the main drivers for that response variable and are carried forward to the
preliminary model. Based on the correlation analysis from the Preliminary Analysis, if
two predictors are highly correlated, then only the predictor that was more predictive (in
terms of significance level) is carried forward. The preliminary model combines all noncorrelated significant predictor variables into a single model.
Preliminary Model Diagnostics. In order to validate the models, the preliminary
model undergoes numerous diagnostic tests. For linear regression models, this includes
comparing the R2 and adjusted R2, using Cook’s Distance to identify influential data
points, testing the studentized residuals for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk Test, and
testing the residuals for constant variance using the Breusch-Pagan test. For logistic
models, diagnostics include assessing the R2 (U), studying the ROC Curve, and
comparing the Wald and Likelihood Ratio Parameter Estimates to identify unstable
variables. If the diagnostics reveal that the model is sound, then the model proceeds to
the refinement stage. If the diagnostics reveal that the model is not sound, the individual
variables are revisited for adjustment. This could include removal of influential data
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points, transformations (such as logarithmic) of the response or predictor variables,
identification of new predictor variables, or transforming a variable from a continuous
variable to a discrete variable.
Model Refinement. In order to identify the most predictive model(s), the
preliminary model undergoes an iterative process of running hundreds of regressions by
adding and removing the remaining predictor variables individually and in groups to
determine if the addition or removal of such variables adds value to the model.
Refinement also includes testing for interaction terms and higher-order terms, such as
quadratics. These new models are evaluated against the preliminary model and each
other by comparing the R2 and adjusted R2 for linear regression models and by comparing
the R2 (U) and using the Likelihood Ratio tests for logistic models.
Refined Model Diagnostics. In order to validate the refined models, these models
undergo the same diagnostics as the preliminary models. If the diagnostics reveal that the
model is theoretically sound, the most predictive model(s) are established as the final
model(s). Otherwise, the data or methodology goes through additional adjustments. See
Chapter IV for the final models.
Results
After establishing the final models, the analysis proceeds to an interpretation of
the models and associated predictor variables. See Chapter V for the discussion of the
results, limitations to the results, and recommendations for further study.
DoD Space Systems Dataset
The DoD dataset uses information annually reported to Congress through the
SAR. The 21 space programs included in this dataset are satellites, launch vehicles,
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strategic missiles, and space-related ground equipment reported in SARs between 1969
and 2006 (see Appendix A for a complete list of the space systems). The dataset includes
total costs of all variance categories (with the adjustments described herein) for both
development and procurement costs associated with the development phase of system
acquisition (Phase B: Design Phase, see Figures 3 and 4 in Chapter I). Like most studies
using SAR data, this study uses a mix of completed and on-going programs. To ensure
enough cost data were available for each program, this study follows the example of
McNichol (2005) by setting a minimum requirement that a program had to have reported
SARs for at least three years in order to qualify for inclusion.
It is important to recognize that using SAR data has a number of drawbacks,
primarily due to the nature of the reporting process. Hough (1992) notes a number of
limitations from using data from the SAR including:
•

Programs do not always use a consistent baseline for the cost estimates

•

Not all elements of cost are included

•

Certain classes of programs, such as special access programs, are not included

•

Guidelines for preparing SARs change over time

•

Differences exist in the interpretation of preparation guidelines

•

Some programs account for risk by including reserve funds in cost estimates

•

Inconsistencies exist in reporting for programs that share costs between services

•

Cost changes are reported in terms of their effects rather than root causes

While recognizing these limitations, this study chooses to use SAR data because it does
provide a significant amount of consistency in the type of data that is collected and the
format in which that data is available.
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DoD Response Variables
The DoD response variables include Total Cost Growth and Per Unit Cost
Growth. Due to the inconsistency in records of schedule data, this analysis does not
include an assessment of DoD space system schedule growth.
Total Cost Growth. The Total Cost Growth response variable compares the actual
or most current estimate (CE) to the original development estimate (DE) from the
initiation of Milestone B. The CE is adjusted for quantity changes by subtracting the cost
growth listed in the Quantity Variance category. Both the DE and CE are adjusted for
inflation by converting both into Constant Year 2007 (CY07) dollars. Cost Growth is
then calculated using Equation 3, which provides Cost Growth in terms of a percentage,
where a value of “zero” means there is no cost growth, a negative value means that the
actual cost (CE) is less than the planned costs (DE), and a positive value means that the
actual cost (CE) is greater than the planned cost (DE).
Cost Growth = (CE-DE)
DE

(3)

Since military cost growth studies and current defense acquisition policies are
inconsistent as to whether or not strategic missiles are treated as space systems, this study
is interested in analyzing the defense data both with and without inclusion of these
systems. Figure 13 shows the histogram for the 21 programs in the DoD dataset. The
histogram reveals the degree to which the data for the response variable represents a
normal distribution. Although normality is not required, tests on preliminary models
from this dataset reveal that the lack of normality for this distribution leads to numerous
problems with the residual diagnostics, and thus this lack of normality prevents adequate
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modeling of this variable. Using the Shapiro-Wilk Test to assess the normality of the
distribution yields a p-value of <0.0001. Since this is well below the 0.05 level of
significance, the test rejects the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal
distribution. As can be seen visually from Figure 13, a single point (Titan IV) clearly
prevents this distribution from being a normal distribution.
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Figure 13. Histogram of DoD Total Cost Growth

Omitting this single observation (Figure 14), improves the distribution’s Shapiro-Wilk
Test p-value to 0.0092; however, this value is still too low, thus rejecting that the data are
from a normal distribution. Even with the removal of Titan IV, preliminary models
continue to have numerous problems with residual diagnostics. Thus, the data are unable
to be sufficiently analyzed in the current form.
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Figure 14. Histogram of DoD Total Cost Growth,
Titan IV omitted

Since analysis of space systems excluding strategic missiles is also of interest, the
analysis tests the data excluding these observations to see if normality is still an issue.
Figure 15, displays the histogram for Total Cost Growth after removing Titan IV and the
five strategic missile observations. This distribution’s Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value is
0.0542, thus failing to reject that the data are from a normal distribution. Although
borderline, this is a significant improvement, and this dataset of 15 points is carried
forward into the analysis for Total Cost Growth. Thus, in the case of Total Cost Growth,
the analysis focuses only on space systems excluding strategic missiles.
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Figure 15. Histogram of DoD Total Cost Growth,
Excluding strategic missiles and Titan IV

Per Unit Cost Growth. Similar to the Total Cost Growth response variable, the
Per Unit Cost Growth response variable compares the actual or most current estimate
(CE) to the original development estimate (DE), adjusted for inflation into CY07 dollars.
The Per Unit Cost Growth response variable accounts for changes in quantity by
adjusting both the DE and the CE into a per unit cost, using Equation 4:
Per Unit =
Cost Growth

[(CE/# of unit for CE)-(DE/# of units for DE)]
DE/# of units for DE

(4)

Figure 16 displays the Per Unit Cost Growth response variable using all 21 observations
(includes strategic missiles). Visually, the graph appears normal, and it has a ShapiroWilk Test p-value of 0.4811, well above the 0.05 level of significance, thus failing to
reject that the data are normally distributed.
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Figure 16. Histogram of DoD Per Unit Cost Growth

Recognizing the utility of a model that excludes strategic missiles, the study also
considers the data without the inclusion of these systems. Figure 17 displays the Per Unit
Cost Growth response variable excluding the strategic missile observations. Visually,
this graph also appears normal, and it has a Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value of 0.7052, thus
failing to reject that the data are normally distributed. Thus, the Per Unit Cost Growth
response variable is carried forward for analysis using both versions (with and without
strategic missiles).
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Figure 17. Histogram of DoD Per Unit Cost Growth
Excluding strategic missiles

DoD Predictor Variables
The study assesses the predictor variables to determine which characteristics are
indicators of cost growth. Some of these, such as Commodity Type, have been used in
past quantitative cost growth studies, others such as Program Manager Tenure are
inspired by the qualitative space studies, and others such as Mission Type are new
additions.
Commodity Type. This predictor captures the commodity classification of the
particular program. The attribute is represented in the dataset by three separate binary
variables: Satellite, Launch Vehicle/Missile, and Ground Equipment. In each case, the
variable is assigned a value of “1” if the system belongs to that category and a value of
“0” otherwise.
Mission Area. This attribute captures the type of mission for the program (note
that a program may belong to more than one mission area). As with Commodity Type,
Mission Area is measured by four separate binary variables: Communications,
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Navigation, Earth Observation (such as visual or infrared scanning), and Space Support
(those systems that perform a significant portion of their mission on land, such as launch
vehicles, strategic missiles, and ground equipment). In each case, the variable is assigned
a value of “1” if the system belongs to that category and a value of “0” otherwise.
Program Size. This attribute is a continuous variable measured in terms of actual
system cost in CY07 dollars. As discussed in the literature review, some studies have
found that smaller programs are associated with higher cost growth.
Development Duration. This is a continuous variable measuring the number of
years between the first development estimate and the last development estimate included
in the study. As discussed in the literature review, studies have found that those
programs with longer development periods (or programs further along in their
development) are associated with higher cost growth. Due to the inconsistency in records
of schedule data, it was not possible to include other schedule variables.
Program Managers. Qualitative DoD space systems studies identified high
rotation of Program Managers as a contributor to space system cost growth. Thus, two
Program Manager variables have been included: # of PMs and PM Tenure. # of PMs is a
discrete variable measuring the number of Program Managers during the system’s
development phase, while PM Tenure is a continuous variable measuring the average
tenure of a Program Manager, calculated by dividing the Development Duration by the #
of PMs.
Baselines. Adjusting the baseline is an indication of major program restructuring.
Thus, two baseline variables have been included to attempt to capture major
programmatic changes. The first, # of Baselines is a discrete variable measuring the
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number of baselines for the system. The second, Baselines/yr is a continuous variable
measuring the number of baselines adjusted for length of the development, calculated by
dividing the # of Baselines by the Development Duration.
Contract Type. This attribute captures the type of contracts that were used in the
development of the program. It is measured by two separate binary variables: Cost Plus
Award Fee (CPAF) and Firm Fixed Price (FFP). In each case, the variable is assigned a
value of “1” if the system belongs to that category and a value of “0” otherwise. Note
that there are other contract types available, but these two are the most widely used for
the programs in the DoD dataset. Many programs use multiple contract types for various
portions of development. Thus, it is feasible for a program to have both a CPAF and a
FFP contract or to have neither.
Lead Service: Air Force. This is a binary variable with a value of “1” if the
system was developed by the Air Force and a value of “0” otherwise.
Cost Breach. This is a binary variable with a value of “1” if the system
experienced a cost breach [cost exceeded 10% of objective cost reported in the
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) (Axtell and Irby, 2007)] during development and a
value of “0” otherwise.
Schedule Breach. This is a binary variable with a value of “1” if the system
experienced a schedule breach [schedule exceeded 6 months from objective schedule
reported in the APB (Axtell and Irby, 2007)] during development and a value of “0”
otherwise.
Prime Contractor. This attribute is measured by four separate binary variables:
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Other Contractor. In each case, the
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variable is assigned a value of “1” if the system was developed by that contractor (or one
of that contractor’s predecessors) and a value of “0” otherwise. Note that in some cases,
a system may have multiple prime contractors.
NASA Space Systems Dataset
The NASA dataset includes data compiled from the 1992 Institute for Defense
Analyses study (Tyson et al., 1992a); the 2004 NASA Headquarters Cost Analysis
Division study (Schaffer, 2004); publicly available online NASA sources including
National Space Science Data Center (“NSSDC,” 2007), JPL Mission and Space Craft
Library (“MSL,” 2007), and NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (“Science,” 2007); as
well as data collected through personal communications with program personnel. The
NASA dataset includes cost, schedule, and descriptive data for 71 satellites and
spacecraft from 1964 to 2004. The cost data includes total development costs through the
launch of the spacecraft. Unlike the DoD dataset which includes both completed and ongoing programs, all 71 NASA programs have completed development and been launched.
See Appendix B for a complete list of the NASA programs used in this study. Since
initial launch estimates and actual launch dates were available for 47 of the programs in
the NASA dataset, the response variables include both cost and schedule growth.
NASA Response Variables
NASA Cost Growth. Similar to the DoD cost growth response variables, the
NASA Cost Growth response variable compares actual development costs to the initial
estimate in terms of a percentage, using Equation 5. The estimate and actual costs are
adjusted for inflation by converting both into Constant Year 2007 (CY07) dollars.
Because NASA programs tend to be formulated around the development of a single
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system, with each spacecraft considered a separate program, quantity adjustments are not
required.
Cost Growth = (Actual-Estimate)
Estimate

(5)

The histogram (Figure 18) of NASA Cost Growth reveals that a number of data
points fall at the high end of the distribution, which may cause the data to not represent a
normal distribution. Testing for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk Test, provides a pvalue of <0.0001. Since p-values less than 0.05 lead to the rejection of the null
hypothesis that the data is from a normal distribution, it is suspected that the values at the
high end of the NASA Cost Growth data represent a separate distribution.
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Figure 18. Histogram of Cost Growth
response variable for NASA systems

Thus, the NASA Cost Growth distribution is divided into two distributions: low
Cost Growth (consisting of 62 observations) and high Cost Growth (consisting of 9
observations). After removing the high cost growth programs, the histogram for low
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Cost Growth (Figure 19) reveals a normal distribution with a Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value
of 0.7143. Since this is greater than 0.05, the Shapiro-Wilk Test fails to reject the null
hypothesis that the data is from the normal distribution.
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Figure 19. Histogram of low Cost Growth
response variable for NASA systems

Due to the small sample size (n = 9), it is unclear from a visual examination of the
histogram for high Cost Growth (Figure 20) whether these values represent a normal
distribution. Fortunately, the Shapiro-Wilk Test was designed for small sample sizes;
Shapiro and Wilk (1965) originally designed the test for 2 < n < 50, and the test has been
shown to be robust for samples n < 2000 (“JMP®”, 2005; Arthur and Seber, 1984).
Testing the distribution of the high Cost Growth programs for normality results in a
Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.3468; since this is greater than 0.05, the Shapiro-Wilk Test
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the data is from the normal distribution. Given that
the full NASA Cost Growth distribution did not pass the test for normality, but the
division of it provides two distributions that do pass the test for normality, it is concluded
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that the NASA Cost Growth response represents a bimodal distribution. Thus, in order to
model cost growth for NASA space systems, it is best to separately model low Cost
Growth and high Cost Growth.
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Figure 20. Histogram of high Cost Growth
response variable for NASA systems

Adapting from the technique implemented by Sipple (2002), this study employs
logistic regression to determine whether or not a program is likely to experience high cost
growth using the binary variable High Cost Growth? with a value “1” for high cost
growth programs and a value of “0” for low cost growth programs. Logistic regression
uses maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters that best model the data, creating a
likelihood function that expresses the probability (as a value between 0 and 1) that the
independent variables predict the dependent variable. For our purposes, a probability
greater than or equal to 0.5 (50%) predicts a program will experience high cost growth,
and a probability of less than 0.5 predicts the program will not experience high cost
growth. See Sipple (2002) for more information on the logistic response function.
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Thus, the first response variable, High Cost Growth?, is a binary variable
measuring the likelihood that a program will experience high cost growth. The second
response variable, Cost Growth, is a continuous variable that measures the percentage of
cost growth that a program is likely to incur. Because the NASA Cost Growth response
represents a bimodal distribution, the analysis models this variable twice, once for each
distribution, thus providing a High Cost Growth Linear Regression Model and a Low
Cost Growth Linear Regression Model.
Schedule Growth. The Schedule Growth response variable compares the planned
launch date to the actual launch date for 47 NASA space systems. Both dates are
measured in the number of months they occur from program initiation. As with Cost
Growth, Schedule Growth is calculated as a percentage using Equation 6.
Schedule Growth =

(Actual Launch Schedule - Planned Launch Schedule)
Planned Launch Schedule

(6)

Similar to Cost Growth, the histogram of Schedule Growth (Figure 21) does not
appear to represent the normal distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk Test rejects the null
hypothesis that the data are from the normal distribution with a p-value of <0.0001.
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Figure 21. Histogram of Schedule Growth
response variable for NASA systems

Using the same methodology as with Cost Growth, the Schedule Growth
distribution is divided into two, to see if it represents a bimodal distribution. Figures 22
and 23 provide the histograms for low Schedule Growth (36 observations) and high
Schedule Growth (11 observations), respectively. Using the Shapiro-Wilk Test, both
distributions fail to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions represent a normal
distribution, with a p-value of 0.0842 for low Schedule Growth and a p-value of 0.0504
for high Schedule Growth.
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Figure 22. Histogram of low Schedule Growth
response variable for NASA systems
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Figure 23. Histogram of high Schedule Growth
response variable for NASA systems

Thus, this study models NASA Schedule Growth in the same manner as NASA
Cost Growth, by first using a binary response variable, High Schedule Growth?, to
determine whether or not the program is likely to experience high schedule growth.
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Then, the study uses a continuous response variable, Schedule Growth, to separately
model high and low Schedule Growth programs.
NASA Predictor Variables
The study assesses a number of predictor variables to determine which
characteristics are indicators of cost or schedule growth. The predictors include
programs size, program start, schedule (for cost growth response), cost growth (for
schedule growth response), mission area, international participation, developer, life span,
and mass.
Program Size. There are two program size variables: Initial Program Size and
Final Program Size. Initial Program Size is a continuous variable measured in terms of
the original estimate of the system cost in CY07 dollars. Final Program Size is a
continuous variable measured in terms of actual system cost in CY07 dollars. As
discussed in the literature review, some studies have found that smaller programs are
associated with higher cost growth.
Program Start. This is a continuous variable measured as the number of years
from 1964 (this year was chosen as the baseline since it represents the earliest start date
in the dataset).
Schedule Characteristics. There are three schedule predictor variables: Estimated
Time to Launch, Actual Time to Launch, and Schedule Growth. Estimated Time to
Launch is a continuous variable measuring the initial planned launch date in number of
months from program initiation. Actual Time to Launch is a continuous variable
measuring the actual launch date in number of months from program initiation. Schedule
Growth is a continuous variable measuring the percent growth between the estimated and
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actual launch schedule: (actual date – planned date)/planned date. The schedule predictor
variables are used with the cost growth response variables only.
Cost Growth. % Cost Growth is a continuous variable measuring the percent
growth between the estimated and actual cost (See Equation 6). The % Cost Growth
predictor variable is used with the schedule growth response variables only.
Mission Area. This attribute captures the type of mission for the program as
catalogued in the National Space Science Data Center database (“NSSDC,” 2007).
Mission area is measured by ten binary variables: Space Physics, Engineering, Earth
Science, Planetary Science, Astronomy, Solar Physics, Human Crew, Communications,
Life Science, and Microgravity. In each case, the variable is assigned a value of “1” if the
system belongs to that category and a value of “0” otherwise. Note that a program may
have more than one mission area.
International Participation. This is a binary variable capturing whether or not
countries other than the U.S. participated in the scientific, technical, or design elements
of the spacecraft. The variable is assigned a value of “1” if the system included
international participation and a value of “0” otherwise.
Developer. This attribute measures the primary organization responsible for
designing and manufacturing the spacecraft. It is measured by nine binary variables:
NASA, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, Lockheed Martin, Boeing,
Northrop Grumman, DoD,12 International Developer, and Other Developer. In each

12

Two DoD programs, DSCS-2 and SCATHA are included in the NASA dataset. A number of NASA
databases have included the cost, schedule, and technical data of these programs due to their similarity to
other NASA programs.
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case, the variable is assigned a value of “1” if the system was developed by that
organization and a value of “0” otherwise.
Life Span. There are two life span predictor variables: Design Life and Actual
Life. Design Life is a continuous variable measuring the intended design life of the
spacecraft in months. Actual Life is a continuous variable measuring the actual life span,
or current estimate of the life span for programs still in operation, in months.
Mass. There are two mass predictor variables: Total Mass and Dry Mass. Total
Mass is a continuous variable measuring the total mass of the spacecraft in kilograms,
including consumable propellants, at the time of launch. Dry Mass is a continuous
variable measuring the mass of the spacecraft in kilograms, excluding consumable
propellants, at the time of launch.
Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the methodology and data used by this study to predict
cost and schedule growth for space systems. The methodology includes collecting and
reviewing the data, performing preliminary analyses, performing inferential analyses, and
then interpreting the results.
The DoD dataset includes cost and programmatic data for 21 space-related
programs from 1969 through 2006, including satellites, launch vehicles, strategic
missiles, and ground equipment. From this dataset, two response variables have been
identified: Total Cost Growth and Per Unit Cost Growth. Additionally, the study
identified a number of programmatic characteristics as potential predictors of cost
growth. Chapter IV includes the Preliminary Analysis and Inferential Analysis for both
of these responses.
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The NASA dataset includes cost, schedule, and descriptive data for 71 satellites
and spacecraft from 1964 to 2004. From this dataset, two response variables have been
identified: Cost Growth and Schedule Growth. Due to the bimodal distribution of these
two variables, the analysis begins by using logistic regression to determine whether or not
the program is likely to experience high growth and then employs separate linear
regressions for high and low growth to predict the quantity of growth. As with the DoD
dataset, the NASA dataset discussion includes identifying programmatic characteristics
that are potential predictors of cost and schedule growth. Chapter IV includes the
Preliminary Analysis and Inferential Analysis for both of these responses.
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IV. Analysis
Chapter Overview
As discussed in the Methodology section of Chapter III, the analysis consists of
two segments: the Preliminary Analysis and the Inferential Analysis. This chapter begins
by detailing the Preliminary Analysis for the Department of Defense (DoD) data set,
followed by the Preliminary Analysis for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) dataset. The Preliminary Analysis compares response values for
individual predictor variables, as well as identifies potential relationships between
predictor variables. The chapter then details the Inferential Analysis, beginning with the
DoD dataset and concluding with the NASA dataset. The Inferential Analysis includes
logistic and linear regression models useful for predicting cost and schedule growth.
Preliminary Analysis
The Preliminary Analysis includes graphical analyses, Student’s t-tests (t-test),
and correlation analyses for select predictor variables. The graphical analyses include bar
graphs of mean (average) growth values by predictor variable in order to identify
potential predictors. Because examining solely the mean values amongst groups can be
misleading, the Preliminary Analysis includes performing t-tests to determine if the
differences in the means are significant. The Preliminary Analysis also includes
correlation analyses between predictor variables to allow for the identification of
multicollinearity13 issues. The discussion herein details only those tests with significant
results.
13

Multicollinearity occurs when two or more predictor variables are intercorreltated. When two highly
correlated predictors are used in a regression model, they create linear redundancy in the model and
diminish the accuracy of the regression coefficients (Gujarat, 1995:320-322).
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Preliminary Analysis: DoD
Total Cost Growth. The study performed preliminary analyses for the Program
Manager Tenure, Contractor, Commodity Type, Mission Area, and Program Size
predictor variables, using all 21 programs in the DoD dataset.
Figure 24 displays average Total Cost Growth by prime contractor: Lockheed
Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and other contractors. From the graph, it appears
that programs developed by Lockheed Martin experience higher cost growth than other
prime contractors. Using a one-tailed t-test to test the alternate hypothesis of unequal
means results in a p-value of 0.0925, therefore programs developed by Lockheed Martin
do experience higher cost growth than the other three contractor categories at the
significance level of 10%, but these results are not significant at the 5% level.
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Figure 24. DoD Total Cost Growth by Prime Contractor
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Figure 25 displays Total Cost Growth by Commodity Type. From viewing the
graph, it appears that ground equipment has the lowest cost growth and launch
vehicles/missiles have the highest cost growth. A one-tailed t-test for ground equipment
results in a p-value of 0.0262, well below a 5% significance level; however, the onetailed t-test for launch vehicles/missiles fails to reject the null hypothesis of equal means
with a p-value of 0.2063. Thus, ground equipment systems have statistically significant
lower cost growth than other systems.
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Figure 25. DoD Total Cost Growth by Commodity Type

Figure 26 displays Total Cost Growth by Mission Area. Visual examination leads
to the alternate hypothesis that communications missions have lower cost growth than
other missions. A one-tailed t-test for communications missions results in a p-value of
0.0447, thus rejecting the null hypothesis of equal means. Thus, systems with
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communications missions have statistically significant lower cost growth than other
systems.
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Figure 26. DoD Total Cost Growth by Mission Area

Per Unit Cost Growth. As with Total Cost Growth, the preliminary analyses
assessed Per Unit Cost Growth using all 21 programs in the DoD dataset. Figure 27
displays Per Unit Cost Growth by Commodity Type. Similar to Total Cost Growth, it
appears that ground equipment has lower per unit cost growth. A one-tailed t-test for
ground equipment rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.0074, well below a 5%
or even 1% significance level. Thus, ground equipment systems have statistically
significant lower per unit cost growth than other systems.
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Figure 27. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth by Commodity Type

Figure 28 displays Per Unit Cost Growth by Mission Area. Visual examination
leads to the alternate hypothesis that earth observation missions have higher per unit cost
growth than other missions. However, a one-tailed t-test for earth observation missions
results in a p-value of 0.1089, just barely failing to reject the null hypothesis at the 10%
level.
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Figure 28. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth by Mission Area

Predictor Correlations. The Preliminary Analysis also includes performing
correlation analysis on the predictor variables in the DoD dataset in order to identify any
variables that may exhibit similar behaviors, and thus lead to multicollinearity issues. If
two predictors are highly correlated, using both in a model can create linear redundancy
and diminish the accuracy of the regression coefficients (Gujarat, 1995:320-322).
Franzblau (1958) identifies correlations values between 0.60 and 0.80 (or between -0.60
and -0.80) as having a “marked degree of correlation” and values between 0.80 and 1.00
(or between -0.80 and -1.00) as having a “high correlation.” Table 3 provides correlation
values for those predictor variables that have correlations greater than 0.6 or less than
-0.6.
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Table 3. Correlations between DoD Predictor Variables

-1.00
1.00

Space Support

1.00

In the case of the # of Program Managers, Development Duration, Cost Breach,
and # of Baselines, time is most likely the underlying factor that ties these variables
together; that is, programs that have had longer development periods would be expected
to have higher values for each of these. During the regression analysis, if two highly
correlated variables were to both appear significant, then including both would cause
linear redundancy in the analysis. In this case, the variable that is most predictive (in
terms of significance level) is kept in the model.
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Preliminary Analysis: NASA
The study includes preliminary analyses for cost and schedule growth with the
Mission Area, Developer, Program Size, and spacecraft Mass variables. The cost
analyses used all 71 programs in which cost data were available, and the schedule
analyses used all 47 programs in which schedule data were available. The discussion
herein details those tests with significant results.
NASA Cost Growth. Figure 29 displays average Cost Growth by Developer.
Note that while the average cost growth for DoD programs is far greater than for the
other developer categories, this dataset only includes two DoD programs. A one-tailed ttest for the alternate hypothesis that DoD programs have higher cost growth fails to reject
the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.1591. However, a one-tailed t-test for the
alternate hypothesis that programs developed by Johns Hopkins have lower cost growth
rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.0419, and a similar test for NASA
developed programs is significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.0893. Thus,
systems developed by Johns Hopkins have statistically significant lower cost growth than
other systems at the 5% level, and systems developed by NASA have statistically
significant lower cost growth than other systems at the 10% level.
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Figure 29. NASA Cost Growth by Developer

Schedule Growth. Figure 30 displays average Schedule Growth by Developer.
From this figure, it appears that Johns Hopkins, Boeing, and Other Developer are
associated with low schedule growth and NASA, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Northrop
Grumman, and International Developer are associated with high schedule growth. Onetailed t-tests on these variables find that these relationships are significant for: Johns
Hopkins with a p-value of <0.0001, Boeing with a p-value of 0.0112, Northrop Grumman
with a p-value of 0.0826, and Other Developer with a p-value of 0.0242. Thus, systems
developed by Johns Hopkins, Boeing, and Other Developers have statistically significant
lower cost growth than other systems, and systems developed by Northrop Grumman
have statistically significant higher cost growth than other systems.
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Figure 30. NASA Schedule Growth by Developer

Predictor Correlations. Correlation analysis was preformed on the predictor
variables in the NASA dataset in order to identify any variables that may exhibit similar
behaviors. Table 4 provides only those correlations that are greater than 0.6 or less than 0.6. As with the DoD predictor correlations, if two highly correlated variables both
appear significant during the regression analysis, then the variable that is most predictive
(in terms of significance level) is kept in the model.
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Inferential Analysis: DoD
Total Cost Growth
As discussed in Chapter III, due to the non-normality of the distribution when
including all of the systems in the DoD dataset, the Total Cost Growth analysis excludes
strategic missiles and Titan IV. The remaining 15 systems include all satellites, other
launch vehicles, and all space-related ground equipment. Equation 7 provides the final
model for predicting Total Cost Growth using the methodology outlined in Chapter III:
CGT = 0.715 – 0.577*(Communications)
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(7)

where CGT is the dependent variable and is the predicted Total Cost Growth as a
percentage of the system’s original estimate, and Communications is a binary variable
with a value of “1” for those systems with a communications mission and a value of “0”
otherwise. The negative coefficient on the Communications variable indicates that those
systems with a communications mission experience lower cost growth than compared to
other missions. To assess the ability of the parameter in the model to explain the
variation in the response, the analysis examines both the R2 and the adjusted R2.14 The R2
for this model is 0.29 and the adjusted R2 is 0.24. The relatively low values of the R2 and
the adjusted R2 indicate that much of the variation in Total Cost Growth is explained by
factors outside of the model. Appendix C provides the complete output provided by the
JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression.
The analysis applies numerous diagnostics to the model in order to test its
robustness. The first diagnostic is the Cook’s Distance test for influential data points.
With this test, values over 0.5 indicate possible influential data points (Neter et al.,
1996:381). The Cook’s Distance for the Total Cost Growth model had all points below
0.3, thus indicating that there are no influential data points present. The second
diagnostic tests the studentized residuals for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk Test.
With this test, a p-value below 0.05 rejects the null hypothesis that the residuals are
normally distributed. Since the optimal model will have normally distributed studentized

14

R2 and adjusted R2 range from “0” to “1,” where a value of “1” indicates that the parameters explain
100% of the variation of the response, and a value of “0” indicates that the parameters provide no
explanation. Since an increase in the number of variables will result in an increase in the R2, the adjusted
R2 is also referenced because it accounts for the number of predictor variables used in the model. Thus,
while a saturated model (one with unnecessary predictor variables) may have a high R2, the saturated model
will not have as high of an adjusted R2. Ideally, the model builder would want both R2 and adjusted R2 to
be close to “1,” as well as close to each other.
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residuals, this requires Shapiro-Wilk p-values over 0.05. The Total Cost Growth model
had a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.4631; thus failing to reject the null hypothesis. The final
diagnostic applied to the Total Cost Growth model tests the residuals for constant
variance using the Breusch-Pagan Test. With this test, a p-value below 0.05 rejects the
null hypothesis that the residuals have constant variance. Thus, similar to the ShapiroWilk Test, because the optimal model will have constant variance of its residuals, this
requires Breusch-Pagan p-values over 0.05. The Breusch-Pagan p-value for the Total
Cost Growth model was 0.1110.
Per Unit Cost Growth
The models for predicting Per Unit Cost Growth include the entire DoD dataset,
as well as excluding strategic missiles in order to provide a model similar to the one
provided for Total Cost Growth. Using the methodology outline in Chapter III, the entire
DoD dataset yielded two separate models for predicting Per Unit Cost Growth.
Equations 8 and 9 provide these models:
CGU1 = 0.869 – 0.941*(Ground Equip) – 0.661*(FFP)

(8)

where CGU1 is the dependent variable and is the predicted Per Unit Cost Growth as a
percentage of the system’s original estimate for unit cost, Ground Equip is a binary
variable with a value of “1” for ground equipment systems and a value of “0” otherwise,
and FFP is a binary variable with a value of “1” for systems developed using a Firm
Fixed Price contract and a value of “0” otherwise. The negative coefficients on both the
Ground Equipment and Firm Fixed Price variables indicate that both of these factors are
associated with lower Per Unit Cost Growth. The R2 for this model is 0.50 and the
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adjusted R2 is 0.44. Appendix D provides the complete output provided by the JMP
Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression.
The model’s diagnostics are satisfactory with all points having a Cook’s Distance
below 0.15, the studentized residuals Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.7392, and the residuals
Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.0581. Because the Breusch-Pagan p-value is very close to
the rejection point of being below 0.05, the analysis examines the plot of the residuals
versus the predicted values (Figure 31) to identify the extent to which the residuals have
non-constant variance. From Figure 31, it appears that a single point to the far left may
be driving this low Breusch-Pagan p-value. Removing this observation increases the
Breusch-Pagan p-value to 0.0721. Appendix E provides the complete output provided by
the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression with the single observation removed.
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Figure 31. Residuals versus Predicted Plot for
DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Model 1
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The second model for predicting Per Unit Cost Growth is:

(9)

CGU2 = 2.069 – 1.178*(Ground Equip) – 0.664*(PM Tenure)
where CGU2 is the dependent variable and is the predicted Per Unit Cost Growth as a
percentage of the system’s original estimate for unit cost, Ground Equip is a binary

variable with a value of “1” for ground equipment systems and a value of “0” otherwise,
and PM Tenure is a continuous variable representing the average Program Manager
Tenure. The negative coefficients on both the Ground Equipment and PM Tenure
variables indicate that both of these factors are associated with lower Per Unit Cost
Growth. The R2 for this model is 0.47 and the adjusted R2 is 0.41. Appendix F provides
the complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression. The
diagnostics for this model are all satisfactory with all points having a Cook’s Distance
below 0.15, the studentized residuals having a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.3160, and the
residuals having a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.7838.
The last model for Per Unit Cost Growth removes the 5 strategic missile
observations from the DoD dataset, to provide a model comparable to the one for Total
Cost Growth. Equation 10 provides this model:
CGU3 = 0.945 – 1.153*(Ground Equip) – 0.666*(FFP)

(10)

where CGU3 is the dependent variable and is the predicted Per Unit Cost Growth as a
percentage of the system’s original estimate for unit cost, Ground Equip is a binary
variable with a value of “1” for ground equipment systems and a value of “0” otherwise,
and FFP is a binary variable with a value of “1” for systems developed using a Firm
Fixed Price contract and a value of “0” otherwise. Note that this model includes the same
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factors as Equation 8, which was for the entire DoD dataset. As with Equation 8,
Equation 10 also has negative coefficients for both Ground Equipment and Firm Fixed
Price, indicating that both of these factors are associated with lower Per Unit Cost
Growth. The R2 for this model is 0.56 and the adjusted R2 is 0.49. Appendix G provides
the complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression. The
diagnostics for this model are also satisfactory with all points having a Cook’s Distance
below 0.2, the studentized residuals having a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.8562, and the
residuals having a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.0697.
Inferential Analysis: NASA
Cost Growth
As discussed in Chapter III, due to the bimodal nature of the distribution,
modeling NASA Cost Growth consists of a two stage process. The first stage includes a
logistic regression model to determine whether a program is likely to experience high
cost growth. The second stage includes separate linear regression models for both high
and low cost growth to determine the likely percentage of cost growth. Note that the low
cost growth model also includes zero and negative cost growth.
Logistic Regression Models. The analysis results in two logistic models for
predicting the likelihood of a program to experience high cost growth; Equations 11 and
13 provide these models: 15
LHCG1
15

=

e 2.140 – 0.058*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Total Mass)
1 + e 2.140 – 0.058*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Total Mass)

Note that JMP® uses the logistic response function:

(11)

e – (ß0 + ß1X1 ß2X2 + ß3X3)
(“JMP®”, 2005).
– (ß0 + ß1X1 ß2X2 + ß3X3)
1+e
For ease of use and interpretation, the negative sign has been multiplied through the parameter estimates it
the equations provided in the text. Thus, the parameter estimates in the JMP® regression outputs in the
Appendices have the opposite sign as those listed within this text.
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where LHCG is the dependent variable and is a likelihood function that expresses the
probability that a program will experience high cost growth, Initial Program Size is a
continuous variable that measures the original estimated cost of the program in CY07
dollars, and Total Mass is a continuous variable that measures the mass of the spacecraft
(including consumable propellants) in kilograms. For our purposes, a LHCG probability
greater than or equal to 0.5 (50%) predicts a program will experience high cost growth,
and a probability of less than 0.5 predicts the program will not experience high cost
growth. Based on the coefficients, larger Initial Program Sizes decreases the likelihood
of experiencing high cost growth; whereas more massive spacecraft increases the
likelihood of experiencing high cost growth. To assess the utility of the model, the R2
(U) is examined. The R2 (U) is a ratio of likelihoods (Equation 12) measuring the
proportion of the total uncertainty attributed to the fitted model.
R2 (U) = -Loglikelihood for Difference between Reduced and Full Model
-Loglikelihood for Reduced Model

(12)

This ratio of likelihoods compares the uncertainty from fitting the model to the
uncertainty from background effects to determine whether the independent variables have
an effect on the response variable (“JMP®”, 2005). R2 (U) ranges between 0 and 1, with
higher values indicating a more predictive model. R2 (U) values equal to or greater than
0.4 are desirable (White, 2007). The NASA High Cost Growth? model provided in
Equation 11 has an R2 (U) of 0.57. See Appendix H for the complete logistic regression
output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005).
Although the diagnostics used for linear regression analysis are not available for
logistic regression, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve can be used to
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assess the model’s accuracy. The ROC curve distinguishes between false-positives and
true-positives, or in other words, how often the model predicts a value of “1” when the
actual value is “0” compared to predicting a value of “1” when the actual value is “1.” A
ROC curve that runs along the 45 degree diagonal of the graph would have an area under
the curve of 0.50, and would have no predictive capability. A ROC curve consisting of a
vertical line from the point (0, 0) to (0, 1) and then a horizontal line from (0, 1) to (1, 1)
would be perfectly predictive and have an area of 1.0. The logistic model in Equation 11
has a ROC curve area of 0.95, indicating an estimated accuracy of 95%. See Figure 32
for the ROC curve of LHCG1.
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Figure 32. LHCG1 Receiver Operating Curve
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Equation 13 provides the second model for predicting High Cost Growth?:
LHCG2 =

e 0.741 – 0.038*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Dry Mass) + 38.705*(Microgravity)
1 + e 0.741 – 0.038*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Dry Mass) + 38.705*(Microgravity)

(13)

where LHCG is the dependent variable and is a likelihood function that expresses the
probability that a program will experience high cost growth, Initial Program Size is a
continuous variable that measures the original estimated cost of the program in CY07
dollars, Dry Mass is a continuous variable that measures the mass of the spacecraft
(excluding consumable propellants) in kilograms, and Microgravity is a binary variable
with a value of “1” for those systems with a microgravity mission and a value of “0”
otherwise. Based on the coefficients, larger Initial Program Sizes decreases the
likelihood of experiencing high cost growth, more massive spacecraft increases the
likelihood of experiencing high cost growth, and a microgravity mission increases the
likelihood of experiencing high cost growth. The R2 (U) associated with this model is
0.50, and the ROC curve area (Figure 33) is 0.94. See Appendix I for the complete
logistic regression output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005).
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Figure 33. LHCG2 Receiver Operating Curve

Linear Regression Models. The analysis developed separate linear regression
models for high and low cost growth programs. These models are designed to be used in
conjunction with the logistic regression models provided in Equations 11 and 13. If the
logistic regression models predict that high cost growth is likely to occur, then the High
Cost Growth Linear Regression Model (Equation 14) can be used to predict the likely
percent cost growth. Similarly, if the logistic regression models predict that high cost
growth is not likely to occur, the Low Cost Growth Linear Regression Model (Equation
15) can be used to predict the likely percent cost growth.
The High Cost Growth Linear Regression Model is:
CGH = 1.232 + 1.037*(Space Physics)
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(14)

where CGH is the dependent variable and is the predicted Cost Growth as a percentage of
the original cost estimate, and Space Physics is a binary variable with a value of “1” for
systems with a space physics mission and a value of “0” otherwise. The positive
coefficient on Space Physics indicates that space physics missions are associated with
higher Cost Growth. The R2 for this model is 0.77 and the adjusted R2 is 0.74. Appendix
J provides the complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this
regression. The diagnostics for this model are all satisfactory with all points having a
Cook’s Distance below 0.4, the studentized residuals having a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of
0.5716, and the residuals having a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.9189.
The Low Cost Growth Linear Regression Model is:
CGL = 0.509 – 0.014*(Program Start)

(15)

where CGL is the dependent variable and is the predicted Cost Growth as a percentage of
the original cost estimate, and Program Start is a continuous variable measured as the
number of years from 1964. The negative coefficient on Program Start signifies that
more recent programs are associated with lower cost growth. The R2 for this model is
0.18 and the adjusted R2 is 0.16. These low R2 values indicate that most of the variation
for cost growth for systems that experience low cost growth is due to factors not
explained by the model. See Appendix K for the complete output provided by the JMP
Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression. The diagnostics for this model are all
satisfactory with all points having a Cook’s Distance below 0.15, the studentized
residuals having a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.2607, and the residuals having a BreuschPagan p-value of 0.0841.
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Schedule Growth
As with NASA Cost Growth, modeling NASA Schedule Growth also consists of a
two stage approach: first using logistic regression to predict the likelihood of
experiencing high schedule growth, then using linear regression to predict the quantity of
schedule growth.
Logistic Regression Model. The logistic model for High Schedule Growth is
given in Equation 16:
LHSG

=

e -2.186 + 0.001*(Final Program Size)
1 + e -2.186 + 0.001*(Final Program Size)

(16)

where LHSG is the dependent variable and is a likelihood function that expresses the
probability that a program will experience high schedule growth, and Final Program Size
is a continuous variable that measures the final cost of the program in CY07 dollars. The
R2 (U) associated with this model is 0.15, and the ROC curve area (Figure 34) is 0.76.
The relatively low R2 (U) and ROC curve areas indicate that this model is not as
predictive as the cost growth logistic models. See Appendix L for the complete output
provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression
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Figure 34. LHSG Receiver Operating Curve

Linear Regression Models. The analysis developed separate linear regression
models for high and low schedule growth programs. As with the cost growth models,
these models are designed to be used in conjunction with the logistic regression model
provided in Equations 16. If the High Schedule Growth? model predicts that high
schedule growth is likely to occur, then the High Schedule Growth Linear Regression
Model (Equation 17) can be used to predict the likely percent of schedule growth. If the
High Schedule Growth? model predicts that high schedule growth is not likely to occur,
then the Low Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model (Equation 18) can be used to
predict the likely percent of schedule growth.
The High Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model is:

94

SGH = 0.899 + 1.188 *(JPL) + 0.587 *(Int’l Develop)

(17)

where SGH is the dependent variable and is the predicted Schedule Growth as a
percentage of the original schedule in months from program initiation, JPL is a binary
variable with a value of “1” for systems developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and
a value of “0” otherwise, and Int’l Develop is a binary variable with a value of “1” for
systems developed by organizations belonging to countries other than the United States
and a value of “0” otherwise. The positive coefficients on both JPL and Int’l Develop
indicate that both of these variables are associated with higher Schedule Growth. The R2
for this model is 0.79 and the adjusted R2 is 0.73. Appendix M provides the complete
output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression. The diagnostics
for this model are: two points have a Cook’s Distance over 0.5, the studentized residuals
have a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.8971, and the residuals have a Breusch-Pagan p-value
of 0.0666. Removal of the two influential data points that have a Cook’s Distance over
0.5 results in the removal of the two points that represent the Int’l Develop variable (total
sample size is 9 observations). Removal of these two points does not affect the intercept,
nor the coefficient or significance level for the JPL variable. The diagnostics for the
model without the two influential data points are: all points have a Cook’s Distance
below 0.3, the studentized residuals have a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.3357, and the
residuals have a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.4450. Appendix N provides the complete
output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression with the two
influential data points removed.
The Low Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model is:
SGL = 0.252 + 0.243 *(Northrop Grumman) – 0.274 *(Johns Hopkins)

95

(18)

where SGL is the dependent variable and is the predicted Schedule Growth as a
percentage of the original schedule in months from program initiation, Northrop
Grumman is a binary variable with a value of “1” for systems developed by Northrop
Grumman (or its predecessors) and a value of “0” otherwise, and Johns Hopkins is a
binary variable with a value of “1” for systems developed by Johns Hopkins University
and a value of “0” otherwise. The positive coefficient on Northrop Grumman indicates
that this developer is associated with higher Schedule Growth; whereas the negative
coefficient on Johns Hopkins indicates that this developer is associated with lower
Schedule Growth. The R2 for this model is 0.27 and the adjusted R2 is 0.23. These low
R2 values indicate that most of the variation for schedule growth for systems that
experience low schedule growth is due to factors not explained by the model. Appendix
O provides the complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this
regression. The diagnostics for this model are: one point has a Cook’s Distance over 0.5,
the studentized residuals have a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.8105, and the residuals have a
Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.2848. Removal of the influential data point does not impact
the intercept nor the coefficient or significance level for the Johns Hopkins variable. The
removal of the influential data point increases the coefficient for Northrop Grumman
from 0.243 to 0.411 and improves the significance level for this variable. The
diagnostics for the model without the influential data point are: all points have a Cook’s
Distance below 0.1, the studentized residuals have a Shapiro-Wilk p-value of 0.0782, and
the residuals have a Breusch-Pagan p-value of 0.2678. Appendix P provides the
complete output provided by the JMP Software (JMP®, 2005) for this regression with the
influential data point removed.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the Preliminary and Inferential Analysis for cost growth of
DoD systems and for cost and schedule growth of NASA systems. The Preliminary
Analysis explored potential relationships between individual predictors and the responses
through graphical presentation. The Preliminary Analysis also identified correlations
between predictor variables. The Inferential Analysis presented linear and logistic
regression models for predicting cost and schedule growth, along with the diagnostics
used to assess these models. The next chapter provides further discussion on these
models and the predictors they identified as significant.
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V. Discussion
Chapter Overview
This chapter highlights those factors found to be predictive of cost and schedule
growth. The discussion begins with the predictors of Department of Defense (DoD)
space system cost growth and then turns to predictors of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) space systems cost and schedule growth. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.
DoD Predictor Discussion
The models for DoD cost growth provided in Table 5 reveal that communications
missions, ground equipment, firm-fixed price contracts, and increased program manager
tenure are all predictive of lower cost growth. One possible explanation for reduced cost
growth for communications missions and ground equipment is the prevalence of these
technologies in the commercial sector. The widespread use and availability of these
types of technologies in both public and private sectors may make these technologies
more mature, and thus less risky, than other missions and commodity types. Ground
equipment also benefits from the ability to test in an operational environment, a luxury
that most space-based systems do not have.
Table 5. DoD Cost Growth Regression Equations
Model Title

Model

Fit

Total Cost
Growth

CGT = 0.715 – 0.577*(Communications)

R2 0.29
Adj. R2 0.24

Per Unit Cost
Growth Model 1
Per Unit Cost
Growth Model 2
Per Unit Cost
Growth Model 3

CGU = 0.869 – 0.941*(Ground Equip) –
0.661*(FFP)
CGU = 2.069 – 1.178*(Ground Equip) –
0.664*(PM Tenure)
CGU = 0.945 – 1.153*(Ground Equip) –
0.666*(FFP)

R2 0.50
Adj. R2 0.44
R2 0.47
Adj. R2 0.41
R2 0.56
Adj. R2 0.49
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Exclusions
Strategic
Missiles and
Titan IV
None
None
Strategic
Missiles

The study also found firm-fixed price contracts (contracts with a specified
payment amount) to be predictive of lower cost growth. This finding is consistent with
Rossetti’s (2004) finding that firm-fixed price contracts are predictive of reduced support
cost growth for DoD weapon systems. However, it is important to remember that
regression analysis identifies relationships but does not indicate cause and effect. It could
be that firm-fixed price contracts provide contractors with an incentive to minimize cost
growth, since additional costs reduce their profit margin. An alternative explanation is
that government programs use firm-fixed price contracts on programs that are relatively
well defined, have mature technologies, and are less risky. Thus, while the models
indicate that firm-fixed price contracts are associated with reduced cost growth, the
models do not reveal whether these types of contracts lead to lower cost growth or are
deliberately chosen for the types of programs that would be expected to have lower cost
growth.
Both the Young Task Force (Defense Science, 2003) and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) (Government, 2006) studies identify high turnover of
Program Managers is a factor that contributes to the cost growth of space systems. This
study supports this assessment, finding that longer Program Manager tenures are
predictive of lower cost growth (and thus, shorter tenures are predictive of higher cost
growth). Additionally, this study quantifies the impact of Program Manager tenure,
finding that a one year increase in Program Manager tenure is associated with a reduction
in per unit cost growth of 66.4 percentage points.
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Although a number of DoD weapons systems cost growth studies have found
smaller programs to be associated with higher cost growth, this study did not find
program size to be predictive of cost growth for space systems.
NASA Predictor Discussion
Cost Growth
Due to the bimodal nature of the cost growth data for the NASA dataset, the
inferential analysis began with dividing the dataset into high cost growth and low cost
growth programs, and then used logistic regression to assess whether a program was
likely to experience high or low cost growth (low cost growth includes no cost growth as
well as negative cost growth). Table 6 provides the NASA cost growth models.

Table 6. NASA Cost Growth Regression Equations
Model
Title
High Cost
Growth?
Logistic
Model 1
High Cost
Growth?
Logistic
Model 2
High Cost
Growth
Linear
Model
Low Cost
Growth
Linear
Model

Model

Fit

LHCG = e 2.140 – 0.058*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Total Mass)
1 + e 2.140 – 0.058*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Total Mass)

R2 (U) 0.57

LHCG = e 0.741 – 0.038*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Dry Mass) + 38.705*(Microgravity)
1 + e 0.741 – 0.038*(Initial Program Size) + 0.001*(Dry Mass) + 38.705*(Microgravity)

R2 (U) 0.50

CGH = 1.232 + 1.037*(Space Physics)

R2 0.77
Adj. R2 0.74

CGL = 0.509 – 0.014*(Program Start)

R2 0.18
Adj. R2 0.16
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From the logistic regression analysis, this study found that larger program size
(measured in total cost) decreased the likelihood of being a high cost growth program,
whereas more massive spacecrafts and microgravity missions increased the likelihood of
being a high cost growth program. This finding of larger programs being associated with
lower cost growth is consistent with many other cost growth studies (Schaffer, 2004;
McCrillis, 2003; Dameron et al., 2002; Pannell, 1994:42; Drezner et al., 1993:27). As
discussed in Chapter II, smaller programs are more likely to experience high cost growth
due to minimal oversight and because equivalent costs and increases in costs represent
proportionally greater amounts of the total cost for smaller programs (Drezner et al.,
1993:49). Further study is recommend to determine the cause of the increased likelihood
of high cost growth for more massive spacecraft and microgravity missions. While this
increased likelihood could be an indication of the increased technical complexity of these
types of systems, it may also be an indication of other problems unique to these programs
such as inadequate cost estimating procedures, deficient program acquisition processes,
or other technical or scientific issues.
After using the logistic regression to determine the likelihood of high cost growth,
the linear regression models are then used for determining the quantity of cost growth.
For those programs that are likely to experience high cost growth, the amount of cost
growth increases for those programs from a space physics mission. Again, further study
is recommended to identify the root causes for this relationship.
For programs in which the logistic models predict to be likely to experience low
cost growth, program start date is the best predictor of the amount of cost growth, with
more recent programs associated with lower cost growth. Further study is recommended
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to determine if this relationship is an indication of improved program acquisition or cost
estimating processes.
Schedule Growth
Similar to the cost growth analysis for NASA space systems, the schedule growth
dataset also displays a bimodal distribution. Thus, the inferential analysis began with
dividing the dataset into high schedule growth and low schedule growth programs, and
then used logistic regression to assess whether a program was likely to have high or low
schedule growth. After determining whether or not high schedule growth was likely, the
linear regression models are then used to determine the amount of likely growth. Table 7
provides the NASA schedule growth models.

Table 7. NASA Schedule Growth Regression Equations
Model Title
High
Schedule
Growth?
Logistic
Model
High
Schedule
Growth
Linear Model
Low
Schedule
Growth
Linear Model

Model

LHSG =

Fit

e -2.186 + 0.001*(Final Program Size)
1 + e -2.186 + 0.001*(Final Program Size)

R2 (U) 0.15

SGH = 0.899 + 1.188 *(JPL) + 0.587 *(Int’l Develop)

R2 0.79
Adj. R2 0.73

SGL = 0.252 + 0.243 *(Northrop Grumman) – 0.274 *(Johns
Hopkins)

R2 0.27
Adj. R2 0.23

The logistic regression results found that larger programs (measured in total cost)
are more likely to experience high schedule growth. For those programs likely to
experience high schedule growth, the linear regressions reveal that those programs
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developed by JPL or an International developer (outside of the U.S.) experience a greater
amount of schedule growth. For those programs likely to experience low schedule
growth, those developed by Northrop Grumman are associated with increased schedule
growth, whereas those space systems developed by Johns Hopkins are associated with a
reduced amount of schedule growth. Keep in mind that these results do not indicate
cause and effect; more research is needed to discover whether these developers have
processes that actually lead to schedule growth (or reduced growth in the case of Johns
Hopkins) or if they are more likely to take-on complex projects that possess other factors
leading to schedule growth.
Interestingly, the study did not find a predictive relationship between cost and
schedule growth for NASA space systems; many of the programs that experienced cost
growth did not experience schedule growth and vice versa. Note that the study did not
find these variables to be negatively correlated either; that is, it does not appear that the
programs avoid one type of growth by permitting the other (e.g., increasing costs in order
to reduce schedule slip). The finding that these types of growth are not strongly
correlated, and thus have different factors influencing each, is consistent with the findings
of Foreman (2007) and Drezner and Smith (1990).
Conclusions
This study provides defense and civil cost estimators and space system acquirers
with a set of models to aid in predicting cost and schedule growth. Since many of the
systems that the defense space acquisition community will be tasked to acquire will be
systems other than ground equipment and communications systems, the analysis suggests
that cost estimators and acquirers should anticipate that other systems are likely to

103

experience higher cost growth, and should plan accordingly. Additionally, this research
indicates that longer Program Manager tenures are associated with decreased cost growth.
The respective model predicts that increasing the average Program Manager tenure by
one-year will reduce the anticipated per unit cost growth by 66.4 percentage points.
Thus, this research supports the recommendation of Young’s Task Force to increase the
length of Program Managers’ tenures (Defense Science, 2003).
Similarly, while NASA will continue to procure a variety of systems, with wide
ranges of program sizes, spacecraft sizes, and mission types, it would behoove cost
estimators and acquirers to recognize that smaller programs, more massive spacecraft,
and microgravity and space physics missions are more vulnerable to experiencing higher
cost growth. Additionally, cost estimators and acquirers should also recognize that while
larger programs are less vulnerable to cost growth, they are more vulnerable to schedule
growth.
Study Limitations
This study is an exploratory analysis, intended to provide a starting point for
developing space system cost and schedule growth models for use by space system
acquirers and cost estimators. The study seeks not only to identify the best predictors of
cost and schedule growth, but also to identify an appropriate methodology for acquirers
and cost estimators to use in establishing their own models. While linear regression
analysis is sufficient for DoD space programs, it is not suitable on its own for NASA
space systems. Instead, the analysis found that NASA systems have bimodal
distributions that are best modeled by first using logistic regression to determine if a
program was likely to experience high or low growth, and then using linear regression
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models to predict the likely amount of growth. While most of the models are highly
predictive, users of the models should keep these limitations in mind:
•

This study is a starting point for quantitatively assessing space system cost growth
using regression analysis. The models should be further validated with space
systems outside of the original dataset. Until this has been accomplished, the
models are only known to be predictive of programs within the dataset.

•

The study identified a bimodal relationship for cost and schedule growth among
NASA programs, however the number of programs belonging to the high cost
growth and high schedule growth categories is relatively small. The NASA
dataset should be augmented with additional programs to verify this bimodal
relationship.

•

This study identifies and quantifies those factors that are best predictors of space
system cost and schedule growth; however, it does not include the depth of a
qualitative study in investigating the root causes of these relationships.

•

This study included only DoD Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)
reported in the Selected Acquisition Report and select NASA spacecraft. The
study does not account for commercial space systems, classified space systems,
NRO space systems, or non-MDAP programs.

•

There are many potential predictors of cost and schedule growth that were not
included in the analysis due to the lack of available data. Potential predictors not
evaluated include: schedule milestones, number of requirements and requirements
changes, amount of systems engineering expertise, and level of technology
maturity.
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•

The models can only be as sound as the data from which they are derived.
Inconsistencies in data format such as which costs are included in the total figure,
the level of technology maturity when the program was initiated, and the
combination or division of multiple satellites into a single or several programs, all
affect the accuracy of the models.

•

The study also includes some assumptions for the inflation and quantity
adjustments. For example, when adjusting DoD Total Cost Growth for quantity,
the current estimate was adjusted by omitting the Quantity Variance category
from the SAR. This assumes that all cost growth related to quantity is captured in
this category. With the NASA datasets, the final cost was adjusted for inflation
by assuming that all costs were in then year dollars for the launch year rather than
breaking the costs down by each year they were incurred and adjusting each year
for inflation separately. It was assumed that the bulk of funds are spent at the tail
end of the program and that assuming all costs were incurred during the launch
year would be a close approximation. While the inflation and quantity
adjustments are not perfect, they better capture reality than if no adjustments were
made at all.

Recommendations for Future Research
From this study stems numerous avenues for further research. Potential future
areas for study include:
•

Test models provided herein with additional data from other NASA and DoD
programs to validate models or establish more robust models,

106

•

Test models provided herein using data from commercial and classified systems
to see if the models apply or if new models are needed,

•

Explore additional predictor variables not evaluated herein, such as requirements,
systems engineering expertise, or technological maturity,

•

Augment NASA data with additional space programs to see if the bimodal
distributions for cost and schedule growth hold, or

•

Further explore relationships identified herein using a more in-depth qualitative
analysis.

Chapter Summary
This study provides a foundation for predicting space system cost and schedule
growth. It explored numerous programmatic characteristics to identify those that are best
predictors of growth. The study provides four models for use in predicting DoD space
system cost growth. It also identified a bimodal distribution for cost and schedule growth
of NASA space systems, and thus established a series of logistic and linear models to
assist in cost and schedule growth forecasting for NASA space systems.
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Appendix A. List of DoD Space Systems

System Name
Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF)
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV)
Global Broadcast Service (GBS)
Minuteman III Guidance Replacement
Program (GRP)
Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement
Program (PRP)
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
(GPS)
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
(GPS) Equipment
National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS)
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
High
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)
Mobile User Objective System
(MUOS)
Defense Satellite Communication
System (DSCS) III
Defense Support Program (DSP)
Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)
Peacekeeper
Titan IV
Minuteman II
Minuteman III
Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program (DMSP)
MILSTAR
Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable
Terminal (SCAMP)

Initial
Selected
Acquisition
Report
(SAR)
2002
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Description
Satellite

1999

Launch Vehicle

1997
1993

Ground Equipment
Strategic Missile Upgrade

1996

Strategic Missile Upgrade

1980

Satellite

1980

Ground Equipment

2002

Satellite

1997

Satellite

2001
2004

Satellite
Satellite

1977

Satellite

1983
1982
1983
1985
1969
1969
1983

Satellite
Launch Vehicle Upper Stage
Strategic Missile
Launch Vehicle
Strategic Missile
Strategic Missile
Satellite

1992
1992

Satellite
Ground Equipment

Appendix B. List of NASA Space Systems
Initial budget
year

Launch
Date

ACE

1994

Aug-97

ACTS

1983

Sep-93

AE-C

1971

Dec-73

AEM-HCMM

1974

Apr-78

ATS-1
ATS-2
ATS-5
ATS-6
Aura

Not Available
Not Available
Not Available
1968
1993

Dec-66
Apr-67
Aug-69
May-74
Jul-04

AXAF

1990

Jul-99

CALIPSO

1999

Apr-06

Cassini
CloudSat
COBE
CONTOUR

1990
1999
1982
2000

Oct-97
Apr-06
Nov-89
Jul-02

COSTR

1987

Jul-92

Deep Space 1

1996

Oct-98

DSCS-2

1969

Nov-71

Endeavour

1987

May-92

EO-1

1996

Nov-00

ESSP (VCL/GRACE)

1997

Mar-02

EUVE
FAST

1984
1989

Jun-92
Aug-96

FUSE

1995

Jun-99

GALEX
Galileo
Genesis

1998
1978
1998

Apr-03
Oct-89
Aug-01

GOES I-M

1984

Apr-94

Program Name
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Full Name
Advanced Composition Explorer
Satellite
Advanced Communications
Technology Satellite
Atmosphere Explorer-C
Application Explorer Mission-Heat
Capacity Mapping Mission
Applications Technology Satellite 1
Applications Technology Satellite 2
Applications Technology Satellite 5
Applications Technology Satellite 6
Aura
(Chandra) Advanced X-Ray
Astrophysics Facility
Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared
Pathfinder Satellite Observations
Cassini
CloudSat
Cosmic Background Explorer
Comet Nucleus Tour
Collaborative Solar Terrestrial
Research
Deep Space 1
Defense Satellite Communications
System
Shuttle Orbiter Endeavour (OV105)
Earth Observing One
Earth Systems Science Pathfinder
(Vegetation Canopy Lidar/Gravity
Recovery and Climate Experiment)
Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer
Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer
Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic
Explorer
Galaxy Evolution Explorer
Galileo
Genesis
Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellite

GRO

1981

Apr-91

HEAO-A

1972

Aug-77

HESSI

1998

Feb-02

HETE-II

1997

Oct-00

HST

1977

Apr-90

ICESat

1996

Jan-03

IMAGE

1996

Mar-00

LANDSAT-A
LANDSAT-D
Lunar Orbiter
Lunar Prospector
Magellan

1969
1977
1964
1996
1984

Jul-72
Jul-82
Aug-66
Jan-98
May-89

MAP

1996

Jun-01

Mars Observer
Mars Odyssey
Mars Pathfinder
MCO
MER
MGS

1985
1998
1994
1996
2000
1994

Sep-92
Apr-01
Dec-96
Dec-98
Jun-03
Nov-96

NEAR

1994

Feb-96

NSCAT
OSO-8

1985
1970

Aug-96
Jun-75

SCATHA

1976

Jan-79

SIRTF

1996

Aug-03

Skylab Workshop
SMS-1

1969
1970

May-73
May-74

SORCE

1999

Jan-03

Space Station

1987

Nov-98

Spacelab
STARDUST

1974
1996

Nov-83
Feb-99
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(Compton) Gamma Ray
Observatory
High Energy Astronomical
Observatory
High Energy Solar Spectroscopic
Imager (now RHESSI)
High Energy Transient
Experiment/Explorer
Hubble Space Telescope
Ice, Clouds and Land Elevation
Satellite
Imager for Magnetopause to Aurora
Global Exploration
Land Remote Sensing Satellite
Land Remote Sensing Satellite
Lunar Orbiter
Lunar Prospector Orbiter
Magellan
(Wilkinson) Microwave Anisotropy
Probe
Mars Observer
Mars Odyssey
Mars Pathfinder
Mars Climate Orbiter
Mars Exploration Rover
Mars Global Surveyor
Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous
(Shoemaker)
NASA Scatterometer
Orbiting Solar Observatory
Spacecraft Charging at High
Altitudes
(Spitzer) Space Infrared Telescope
Facility
Skylab Workshop
Synchronized Meteorology Satellite
Solar Radiation and Climate
Experiment
International Space Station Alpha
(ISSA)
Spacelab
Star Dust

SWAS/TRACE/WIRE

1989

Apr-98

TDRSS replen

1994

Jun-00

TDRSS-7
Terra

1986
1991

Jul-95
Dec-99

TIMED

1997

Dec-01

Not Available

Jan-70

TOPEX

1987

Aug-92

TRMM

1991

Nov-97

TSS

1984

Jul-92

UARS

1982

Sep-91

Ulysses
Viking Lander
XTE

1979
1970
1990

Oct-90
Aug-75
Dec-95

TIROS-M
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Submillimeter Wave Astronomy
Satellite/Transition Region and
Coronal Explorer/Wide-Field
Infrared Explorer
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 3 replenishment satellites
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
EOS AM-1
Thermosphere, Ionosphere,
Mesosphere Energetics and
Dynamics
Television Infrared Observation
Satellite (also ITOS-1)
Ocean Topography
Experiment/Poseidon
Tropical Rainfall Measuring
Mission
Tethered Satellite System
Upper Atmosphere Research
Satellite
Ulysses
Viking Lander
(Rossi) X-Ray Timing Explorer

Appendix C. DoD Total Cost Growth Linear Regression Model Output
Whole Model
Regression Plot

Msn: Communications
Leverage Plot
1.5
Adjusted % growth
Leverage Residuals

Adjusted % growth

1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.25

0

.25

.5

.75

1

1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-0.25 .00

1.25

Msn: Communications

Actual by Predicted Plot

.25

.50

.75

1.00 1.25

Msn: Communications
Leverage, P=0.0382

Residual by Predicted Plot
1.0

Adjusted %
growth Residual

Adjusted %
growth Actual

1.5
1
0.5
0

0.5

0.0

-0.5
.0

.5

1.0

1.5

.0

Adjusted % growth Predicted
P=0.0382 RSq=0.29 RMSE=0.4836

.5

1.0

1.5

Adjusted % growth Predicted

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.290373
0.235787
0.483612
0.445538
15

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
1
13
14

Sum of Squares
1.2441269
3.0404483
4.2845752

Mean Square
1.24413
0.23388

F Ratio
5.3195
Prob > F
0.0382

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Msn: Communications

Estimate
0.7149335
-0.577277

Std Error
0.170983
0.250293

t Ratio
4.18
-2.31
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Prob>|t|
0.0011
0.0382

Std Beta
0
-0.53886

Min Value Max Value
0

1

Appendix D. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Linear Regression Model 1 Output
Ground Equip
Leverage Plot

FFP
Leverage Plot
2.0
% Per Unit Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Per Unit Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals
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Leverage, P=0.0022

.25

.50

.75

1.00 1.25

FFP Leverage, P=0.0125

Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

Residual by Predicted Plot

2
1.0
% Per Unit Cost
Growth Residual

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Actual

1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-1.0

-0.5

.0

.5

1.0

1.5

0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.0

2.0

% Per Unit Cost Growth Predicted
P=0.0021 RSq=0.50 RMSE=0.5088

-0.5

.0

.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Predicted

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.496146
0.440163
0.508769
0.424743
21

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
2
18
20

Sum of Squares
4.5879632
4.6592316
9.2471948

Mean Square
2.29398
0.25885

F Ratio
8.8623
Prob > F
0.0021

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Ground Equip
FFP

Estimate
0.8693884
-0.941423
-0.661491

Std Error
0.155493
0.263987
0.238515

t Ratio
5.59
-3.57
-2.77
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Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.0022
0.0125

Std Beta
0
-0.60425
-0.46992

Min Value Max Value
0
0

1
1

Appendix E. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Linear Regression Model 1 Output:
Excludes GPS User Equipment
Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

Residual by Predicted Plot

2

1.0
% Per Unit Cost
Growth Residual

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Actual

1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5
-0.5

.0

.5

1.0

1.5

0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-0.5

2.0

.0

% Per Unit Cost Growth Predicted
P=0.0165 RSq=0.38 RMSE=0.5221

Ground Equip
Leverage Plot

1.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

% Per Unit Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Per Unit Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

1.0

FFP
Leverage Plot

2.0

1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-0.25

.5

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Predicted

.00

.25

.50

.75

1.00

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-0.25

Ground Equip
Leverage, P=0.0099

.00

.25

.50

.75

1.00

FFP Leverage, P=0.0326

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.382844
0.310237
0.522114
0.489074
20

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
2
17
19

Sum of Squares
2.8747826
4.6342448
7.5090275

Mean Square
1.43739
0.27260

F Ratio
5.2728
Prob > F
0.0165

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Ground Equip
FFP

Estimate
0.856553
-0.896499
-0.627263

Std Error
0.165107
0.308887
0.269618

t Ratio
5.19
-2.90
-2.33
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Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.0099
0.0326

Std Beta
0
-0.58524
-0.46912

Min Value

Max Value

0
0

1
1

Appendix F. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Linear Regression Model 2 Output
Residual by Predicted Plot

2

1.5

1.5

1.0

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Residual

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Actual

Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

1
0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-1.0

-0.5

.0

.5

1.0

1.5

0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.0

2.0

-0.5

Ground Equip
Leverage Plot

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

% Per Unit Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Per Unit Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

.5

PM Tenure
Leverage Plot

2.0

1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-0.5

.0

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Predicted

% Per Unit Cost Growth Predicted
P=0.0035 RSq=0.47 RMSE=0.5232

.0

.5

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

1.0

1.0

Ground Equip
Leverage, P=0.0011

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

PM Tenure Leverage, P=0.0219

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.467177
0.407974
0.523191
0.424743
21

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
2
18
20

Sum of Squares
4.3200722
4.9271226
9.2471948

Mean Square
2.16004
0.27373

F Ratio
7.8911
Prob > F
0.0035

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Ground Equip
PM Tenure

Estimate
2.0692045
-1.177888
-0.664477

Std Error
0.591726
0.302594
0.264845

t Ratio
3.50
-3.89
-2.51
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Prob>|t|
0.0026
0.0011
0.0219

Std Beta
0
-0.75602
-0.48728

Min Value Max Value
0
1

1
3

Appendix G. DoD Per Unit Cost Growth Linear Regression Model 3 Output:
Excludes Strategic Missiles
Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

Residual by Predicted Plot
1.0

2

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Residual

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Actual

1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-1.0

0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

-0.5

.0

.5

1.0

1.5

-1.0

2.0

-0.5

.0

% Per Unit Cost Growth Predicted
P=0.0047 RSq=0.56 RMSE=0.5316

Ground Equip
Leverage Plot

1.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

% Per Unit Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Per Unit Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

1.0

FFP
Leverage Plot

2.0

1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-0.25 .00

.5

% Per Unit Cost
Growth Predicted

.25

.50

.75

1.00 1.25

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-0.25 .00

Ground Equip
Leverage, P=0.0049

.25

.50

.75

1.00 1.25

FFP Leverage, P=0.0307

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.561866
0.49446
0.531616
0.479506
16

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
2
13
15

Sum of Squares
4.7115613
3.6740053
8.3855666

Mean Square
2.35578
0.28262

F Ratio
8.3356
Prob > F
0.0047

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Ground Equip
FFP

Estimate
0.9453955
-1.153119
-0.665813

Std Error
0.181404
0.340798
0.27476

t Ratio
5.21
-3.38
-2.42
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Prob>|t|
0.0002
0.0049
0.0307

Std Beta
0
-0.6217
-0.44525

Min Value Max Value
0
0

1
1

Appendix H. NASA Cost Growth Logistic Regression Model 1 Output
Whole Model Test
Model
-LogLikelihood
Difference
10.683222
Full
8.153711
Reduced
18.836933
RSquare (U)
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

DF
2

ChiSquare
21.36644

Prob>ChiSq
<.0001

0.5671
54

Converged by Gradient

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Saturated
Fitted

DF
51
53
2

-LogLikelihood
8.1537110
0.0000000
8.1537110

ChiSquare
16.30742
Prob>ChiSq
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Initial Program Size (Original
Estimate CY07)
Total Mass (kg)
For log odds of 0/1

Estimate
Std Error ChiSquare
-2.139853 1.5549805
1.89
0.05798487 0.0265758
4.76
-0.001285 0.0006474

3.94

Prob>ChiSq
0.1688
0.0291
0.0472

Min Value Max Value
9.9

27802
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109000

Effect Wald Tests
Source
Initial Program Size (Original Estimate CY07)
Total Mass (kg)

Nparm
1
1

DF
1
1

Wald ChiSquare
4.7605558
3.93933688

Prob>ChiSq
0.0291
0.0472

Nparm
1
1

DF
1
1

L-R ChiSquare
21.3478893
14.0306169

Prob>ChiSq
<.0001
0.0002

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests
Source
Initial Program Size (Original Estimate CY07)
Total Mass (kg)

Receiver Operating Characteristic
1.00
0.90
0.80
True Positive
Sensitivity

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
.00 .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80 .90 1.00
1-Specificity
False Positive
Using High Cost Growth?='1' to be the positive level
Area Under Curve = 0.95139
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Appendix I. NASA Cost Growth Logistic Regression Model 2 Output
Whole Model Test
Model
-LogLikelihood
Difference
13.238856
Full
13.049413
Reduced
26.288270
RSquare (U)
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

DF
3

ChiSquare
26.47771

Prob>ChiSq
<.0001

0.5036
66

Converged by Gradient

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Saturated
Fitted

DF
62
65
3

-LogLikelihood
13.049413
0.000000
13.049413

ChiSquare
26.09883
Prob>ChiSq
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Initial Program Size (Original
Estimate CY07)
Dry Mass (kg)
Msn: Microgravity
For log odds of 0/1

Estimate
Std Error ChiSquare
-0.7413099 1.0158722
0.53
0.03752431 0.0166158
5.10
-0.0008909 0.0003625
-38.705311 83316.394

6.04
0.00

Prob>ChiSq
0.4656
0.0239
0.0140
0.9996

Min Value Max Value
9.9

27802

117
0

90607
1

Effect Wald Tests
Source
Initial Program Size (Original Estimate CY07)
Dry Mass (kg)
Msn: Microgravity

Nparm
1
1
1

DF
1
1
1

Wald ChiSquare
5.10013649
6.03971535
2.15814e-7

Prob>ChiSq
0.0239
0.0140
0.9996

Nparm
1
1
1

DF
1
1
1

L-R ChiSquare
23.2927602
17.3608073
9.25815588

Prob>ChiSq
<.0001
<.0001
0.0023

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests
Source
Initial Program Size (Original Estimate CY07)
Dry Mass (kg)
Msn: Microgravity

Receiver Operating Characteristic
1.00
0.90
0.80
True Positive
Sensitivity

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
.00 .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80 .90 1.00
1-Specificity
False Positive

Using High Cost Growth?='1' to be the positive level
Area Under Curve = 0.93957
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Appendix J. NASA High Cost Growth Linear Regression Model Output
Whole Model
Regression Plot

Actual by Predicted Plot

2.5
% Cost
Growth Actual

% Cost Growth

2.5

2

1.5

2

1.5

1

1
-0.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 1.1

1.0

Msn: Space Physics

Residual by Predicted Plot

2.0

2.5

Msn: Space Physics
Leverage Plot

0.5

2.5
% Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Cost Growth
Residual

1.5

% Cost Growth Predicted
P=0.0019 RSq=0.77 RMSE=0.3194

0.3
0.1
-0.1
-0.3

2.0
1.5
1.0

-0.5
1.0

1.5

2.0

-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 1.1

2.5

Msn: Space Physics
Leverage, P=0.0019

% Cost Growth Predicted

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.769929
0.737061
0.319372
1.69328
9

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
1
7
8

Sum of Squares
2.3893554
0.7139911
3.1033465

Mean Square
2.38936
0.10200

F Ratio
23.4253
Prob > F
0.0019

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Msn: Space Physics

Estimate
1.2324251
1.0369233

Std Error
0.142828
0.214242

t Ratio
8.63
4.84
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Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.0019

Std Beta
0
0.877456

Min Value Max Value
0

1

Appendix K. NASA Low Cost Growth Linear Regression Model Output
Actual by Predicted Plot

1

1

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

% Cost
Growth Actual

% Cost Growth

Whole Model
Regression Plot

0.4
0.2
0
-0.2

0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4

-0.4

-0.6
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2

-0.6
-5

0

5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Program Start
(Yrs from Baseline)

Residual by Predicted Plot

.2

.4

.6

.8

1.0

Program Start (Yrs from Baseline)
Leverage Plot

0.6

1.0

0.4

0.8
% Cost Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Cost Growth
Residual

.0

% Cost Growth Predicted
P=0.0009 RSq=0.18 RMSE=0.2903

0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4

-0.8
-1.0
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 .0

-0.6

.2

.4

.6

.8

-5

1.0

0

5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Program Start (Yrs from
Baseline) Leverage, P=0.0009

% Cost Growth Predicted

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.179217
0.16456
0.290302
0.187642
58

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
1
56
57

Sum of Squares
1.0304816
4.7194180
5.7498996

Mean Square
1.03048
0.08428

F Ratio
12.2276
Prob > F
0.0009

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Program Start (Yrs from Baseline)

Estimate
0.50853
-0.013585

Std Error
0.099368
0.003885
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t Ratio
5.12
-3.50

Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.0009

Std Beta
0
-0.42334

Min Value Max Value
0

36

Appendix L. NASA Schedule Growth Logistic Regression Model Output
Logistic Plot

Receiver Operating Characteristic

1.00

1.00
0.90

0.75

0.80
0.70
True Positive
Sensitivity

High Schedule Growth?

1

0.50
0
0.25

0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20

0.00
0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

0.10

Final Program Size (Actual Cost CY07)

0.00
.00 .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80 .90 1.00
1-Specificity
False Positive

Using High Schedule Growth?='1' to be the positive level
Area Under Curve = 0.76010

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
3.747015
21.826393
25.573407

RSquare (U)
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

DF
1

ChiSquare
7.49403

Prob>ChiSq
0.0062

0.1465
47

Converged by Gradient

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Saturated
Fitted

DF
44
45
1

-LogLikelihood
21.826393
0.000000
21.826393

ChiSquare
43.65279
Prob>ChiSq
0.4864

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Final Program Size (Actual Cost CY07)

Estimate

Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiS
q
2.18565739 0.5739752
14.50
0.0001
-0.0013652 0.0005352
6.51
0.0107

Min Value

Max Value

23

38589

For log odds of 0/1

Effect Wald Tests
Source
Final Program Size (Actual Cost CY07)

Nparm
1

DF
1

Wald ChiSquare
6.50744631

Prob>ChiSq
0.0107

Nparm
1

DF
1

L-R ChiSquare
7.4940299

Prob>ChiSq
0.0062

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests
Source
Final Program Size (Actual Cost CY07)
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Appendix M. NASA High Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model Output
Residual by Predicted Plot

2.2

0.4

2

0.3

1.8

0.2

% Schedule
Growth Residual

% Schedule
Growth Actual

Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

1.6
1.4
1.2
1

0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3

0.8

-0.4

.8

.8

1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2

% Schedule Growth Predicted
P=0.0081 RSq=0.80 RMSE=0.2489

Int'l Develop
Leverage Plot

2.2

2.2

2.0

2.0
% Schedule Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Schedule Growth
Leverage Residuals

JPL
Leverage Plot

1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2

% Schedule Growth Predicted

1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8

1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8

-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0

-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0

JPL Leverage, P=0.0045

Int'l Develop
Leverage, P=0.0278

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.799249
0.732332
0.24891
1.161566
9

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
2
6
8

Sum of Squares
1.4799994
0.3717381
1.8517375

Mean Square
0.740000
0.061956

F Ratio
11.9439
Prob > F
0.0081

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
JPL
Int'l Develop

Estimate
0.899177
1.1877795
0.5868608

Std Error
0.101617
0.268854
0.203234

t Ratio
8.85
4.42
2.89
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Prob>|t|
0.0001
0.0045
0.0278

Std Beta
0
0.822943
0.537883

Min Value Max Value
0
0

1
1

Appendix N. NASA High Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model Output: Two
Influential Data Points Removed
Whole Model
Regression Plot

Actual by Predicted Plot
2.2

2

2

1.8

1.8

% Schedule
Growth Actual

% Schedule Growth

2.2

1.6
1.4
1.2
1

1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8

0.8

.8

-0.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 1.1
JPL

JPL
Leverage Plot

0.25

2.2

0.20

2.0
% Schedule Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Schedule
Growth Residual

Residual by Predicted Plot

1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2

% Schedule Growth Predicted
P=0.0009 RSq=0.91 RMSE=0.1557

0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
-0.05
-0.10

1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8

.8

1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2

-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 1.1

% Schedule Growth Predicted

JPL Leverage, P=0.0009

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.908932
0.890719
0.155666
1.06886
7

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
1
5
6

Sum of Squares
1.2092745
0.1211595
1.3304340

Mean Square
1.20927
0.02423

F Ratio
49.9042
Prob > F
0.0009

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
JPL

Estimate
0.899177
1.1877795

Std Error
0.06355
0.168138

t Ratio
14.15
7.06
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Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.0009

Std Beta
0
0.953379

Min Value

Max Value

0

1

Appendix O. NASA Low Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model Output
Residual by Predicted Plot

0.8

0.5

0.7

0.4

0.6

0.3

% Schedule
Growth Residual

% Schedule
Growth Actual

Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.1 .0

0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

-0.4
-0.1 .0

.8

% Schedule Growth Predicted
P=0.0057 RSq=0.28 RMSE=0.1814

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

% Schedule Growth Predicted

Northrop Grumman
Leverage Plot

Johns Hopkins
Leverage Plot

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

% Schedule Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Schedule Growth
Leverage Residuals

0.2

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

0.0
-0.1
-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 1.1

-0.1
-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 1.1
Johns Hopkins
Leverage, P=0.0182

Northrop Grumman
Leverage, P=0.0345

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.276105
0.230861
0.181377
0.249582
35

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
2
32
34

Sum of Squares
0.4015266
1.0527272
1.4542538

Mean Square
0.200763
0.032898

F Ratio
6.1026
Prob > F
0.0057

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Northrop Grumman
Johns Hopkins

Estimate
0.252222
0.2429117
-0.27371

Std Error
0.033681
0.110001
0.110001

t Ratio
7.49
2.21
-2.49
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Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.0345
0.0182

Std Beta
0
0.333603
-0.3759

Min Value Max Value
0
0

1
1

Appendix P. NASA Low Schedule Growth Linear Regression Model Output:
Influential Data Point Removed
Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

Residual by Predicted Plot

0.8

0.5

0.7

0.4
% Schedule
Growth Residual

% Schedule
Growth Actual

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.1 .0

0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

-0.3
-0.1 .0

.8

% Schedule Growth Predicted
P=0.0005 RSq=0.39 RMSE=0.1687

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

% Schedule Growth Predicted

Northrop Grumman
Leverage Plot

Johns Hopkins
Leverage Plot

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

% Schedule Growth
Leverage Residuals

% Schedule Growth
Leverage Residuals

0.3

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

0.0

-0.1
-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 1.1

-0.1
-0.1 .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 1.1

Johns Hopkins
Leverage, P=0.0118

Northrop Grumman
Leverage, P=0.0022

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.389509
0.350123
0.168731
0.252266
34

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
2
31
33

Sum of Squares
0.5631070
0.8825755
1.4456826

Mean Square
0.281554
0.028470

F Ratio
9.8894
Prob > F
0.0005

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Northrop Grumman
Johns Hopkins

Estimate
0.252222
0.4113118
-0.27371

Std Error
0.031333
0.123356
0.102332

t Ratio
8.05
3.33
-2.67
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Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.0022
0.0118

Std Beta
0
0.469337
-0.37649

Min Value Max Value
0
0

1
1
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